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ARTICLES
Managing Terrorism
Fionnuala Nı´ Aoláin* & Colm Campbell**
Legal analysis of the now much maligned “war on terror” has been a growth
industry in the United States, the United Kingdom, and elsewhere since the events
of September 11, 2001.1 A substantial literature spanning multiple legal systems
has emerged to address its scope, nomenclature and consequences. How best to
respond to and regulate terrorism remains a contested debate intellectually and
practically. Modeling of various forms pervades the field. For example, some
scholars and policy makers employ a “business as usual” counter-terrorism model
critiquing reliance on exceptional procedures when dealing with violence and insurgency.2 This model assumes the sufficiency of the ordinary law to cope with
challenges posed by violent actors and other security threats. But most models
assume that exceptional legal powers will be adopted to address terrorism, and explicitly or implicitly depict this adoption in terms of some form of norm-exception
continuum. Sustained debates pervade both legal scholarship and practice on the
acceptance of exceptional (anti-terrorism) norms as lawful and legitimate counterpoised with trenchant views on exceptional norms as characterized or defined
by lawlessness.3 Such debates, scholarship and analysis are regularly based on
supposition rather than empirical knowledge or testing.
* Fionnuala Nı´ Aoláin is University Regents Professor & Robina Chair in Law, Public Policy and
Society at the University of Minnesota Law School, and Professor of Law at the Transitional Justice
Institute, Ulster University, Northern Ireland. We note our thanks to Ita Connolly for her research work
on the empirical aspects of this project. We thank Ami Hutchinson, Jesse Goldfarb and Amanda
McAlister for research assistance. Comments by Professors Clive Walker and Louise Mallinder were
helpful in the revisions of this article. All remaining faults lie with the authors. © 2018, Fionnuala Nı´
Aoláin* & Colm Campbell.
** Professor Colm Campbell is an Emeritus Professor at the Transitional Justice Institute, Ulster
University.
1. See, e.g., DAVID COLE, SECURING LIBERTY: DEBATING ISSUES OF TERRORISM AND DEMOCRATIC
VALUES IN THE POST-9/11 UNITED STATES (2011); CIAN C. MURPHY, EU COUNTER-TERRORISM LAW:
PRE-EMPTION AND THE RULE OF LAW (2012); ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIENNE VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE
BALANCE: SECURITY, LIBERTY, AND THE COURTS (2007); KENT ROACH, SEPTEMBER 11: CONSEQUENCES
FOR CANADA (2003); GLENN SULMASY, THE NATIONAL SECURITY COURT: A NATURAL EVOLUTION OF
JUSTICE IN AN AGE OF TERROR (2009); Gabor Rona, A Bull in the China Shop: The War on Terror and
International Law in the United States, 39 CAL. W. INT’L. L.J. 135 (2008); Clive Walker, Terrorism and
Criminal Justice: Past, Present and Future, CRIM. L. REV. 311 (2004); John Yoo, Courts at War, 91
CORNELL L. REV. 573 (2006).
2. OREN GROSS & FIONNUALA NÍ AOLÁIN, LAW IN TIMES OF CRISIS: EMERGENCY POWERS IN THEORY
AND PRACTICE 86–109 (2006).
3. GIORGIO AGAMBEN, STATE OF EXCEPTION 3 (Kevin Attell trans., University of Chicago Press
2005) (2003); GROSS & AOLÁIN, supra note 2, at 110–70; Oren Gross, The Normless and Exceptionless
Exception: Carl Schmitt’s Theory of Emergency Powers and the “Norm-Exception” Dichotomy, 21
CARDOZO L. REV. 1825 (2000).
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Security argumentation significantly based on supposition raises important
questions as to whether the underpinning assertions in the national security sphere
are normatively justifiable. Recognition of such lacunae tends to highlight other
gaps—specifically that claims about the effectiveness of particular exceptional
powers also tend to rely upon normative assertions that they “ought to work,”
unsupported by verifiable data. Data gaps abound in national security debates,
and in legal contestation about whether anti-terrorism regulation is effective or
necessary. This article dives into that empirical gap by providing unique data on
the operation of detention, arrest, and trial regimes created to counter and manage
terrorism in the United Kingdom. While the data is specific to the regulation of
terrorism in the United Kingdom, we claim that our analysis is useful and applicable to the regulation of terrorism by other democratic states, including the United
States. We have chosen to focus on democratic states because we do not assume
the replicability of these finding to non-democratic states, where the pull to legality is not present in the same way, nor the pressure points both external and internal comparable.
Emergencies and national security needs present unique challenges to datagathering by empirical legal researchers; to state the obvious, few countries permit outsiders’ presence during waterboarding. But, if data on interrogation practices and on exceptional courts’ operation can be obtained, they offer a route to
evaluating claims about the nature and form of the norm-exception relationship.4
Moreover, such data offer a means to appraise critical assumptions that pervade
national security discourses concerning the efficiency, necessity, and rationale
for certain forms of macro- and micro-regulation. Courts and custodial settings
are particularly important sites in which the state and non-state actors engage in
what Charles Tilly called the “repertoire of contention.”5 The contestation spans
legitimacy, lawfulness, lawlessness, efficiency and human rights-based compliance in court and interrogation practices. In the “state of justice” (rechtsstaat),
the ideal frequently invoked by democratic states while countering terrorism,6
this contention is certain to involve legal claims-making by multiple actors in
myriad ways.7 We examine both the political and the legal dynamic of contention
in this article.

4. See John Ferejohn & Pasquale Pasquino, The Law of Exception: A Typology of Emergency
Powers, 2 INT’L J. CONST. L. 210 (2004). For recent applications of these relationships, see INT’L FED’N
FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (FIDH), France: International Fact-Finding Mission Report, Counter-Terrorism
Measures and Human Rights, When the Exception Becomes the Norm (June 2016), https://www.fidh.
org/IMG/pdf/report_counter_terrorism_measures_human_rights.pdf.
5. CHARLES TILLY, REGIMES AND REPERTOIRES 30–59 (2006).
6. The notion of “rechtstaat” derives from a doctrine in continental European legal thinking which
originated in German jurisprudence. The closest translation into English is “a state based on the rule of
law.” See NEVIL JOHNSON, STATE AND GOVERNMENT IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY: THE
EXECUTIVE AT WORK 13 (2d ed. 1983).
7. See Colm Campbell & Ita Connolly, Making War on Terror? Global Lessons from Northern
Ireland, 69 MOD. L. REV. 935 (2006).
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If trial in the special/exceptional/terrorist court amounts to a contest with the
state, it is also likely to be a site of interaction and perhaps contestation between
the open state (typified by the law-based conventional court), and the secret state
(typified by intelligence gathering, interrogation, rendition, and related practices).
The secret state is likely to be involved in the process that led to the defendant’s arrest (through electronic or personal surveillance, or recruiting and operating informers); in the interrogation of the suspect (whether by conducting
interrogations or by briefing interrogators); and in the trial process when there
is an attempt to rely upon or to discredit evidence obtained from intelligence
sources. While the nature of the secret state makes it a virtually impossible subject of direct legal research, its operation may nevertheless leave legal traces
(for instance, the arrest of a terrorism suspect at home at 4 a.m., has a high
probability of being intelligence-reliant). Assembling and triangulating such
traces may allow one to construct the elements of the secret state’s operation.8
As such, we can explore the relationship between the law and violent (and
other) challengers, assess the claims of the state for particular kinds of legal
powers for specific kinds of security challenges, and explore the extent to
which law is present, absent, or muted in the national security arena. Our article offers some preliminary roadmaps on how the intersection of empirical
legal analysis with contextual framing reveals the complex interplay between
the open and secret state, giving a unique insight into the operation of counterterrorism practices illustrated through detention and trial processes.
Part I of this article addresses the challenges and specificity of obtaining reliable data on terrorism, and outlines the features and practice of the United
Kingdom’s anti-terrorist apparatus, specifically the arrest, detention, and trial
regimes used to manage terrorism from the late 1970s to the present day. Here we
explore the overlap between terrorism management systems in the United
Kingdom with parallel structures in other democracies, addressing the core tension between a law-enforcement model and a counter-insurgency model during
arrest, interrogation, and trial. Drawing directly on our dataset of terrorist trials,
Part II of the article takes a close look at who is being arrested and processed for
trial. We are particularly interested in the profile of defendants charged with terrorist offenses, and we offer a number of counter-intuitive insights which speak
directly to issues of profiling and mobilization for politically-motivated violence.
Part III closely examines arrest patterns, paying careful attention to which actors
are undertaking arrest, and how these actors change over time, thereby tracking
the move from militarization to crime-enforcement strategies in the management
of terrorist challengers. Part IV takes us to the interrogation room, where we use
our data to glean fresh insights into the tensions that surface between legality and
counter-terrorism management in the encounter between the detainee and the
interrogator. Legality is engaged by the formalities of arrest and the potential to
be charged with a specified crime; counter-terrorism management is invariably
8. See Laura K. Donohue, The Shadow of State Secrets, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 77, 84–86 (2010).
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present from the opportunities to gather intelligence (as opposed to trial useful)
information, to convince a detainee to cooperate and collude with the state as an
informer, and because of the ever-present danger of ill-treatment to elicit information about impending terrorist attacks which a detainee is unwilling or unable
to give that information freely. Here we illustrate the increased juridification of
the interrogation encounter over time, a phenomenon we characterize as the inevitable consequence of managing terrorism through law in a democracy. Access to
lawyers is the focus of Part V, where our data points to a strained relationship
between access to counsel and the goals of the interrogation process. Uniquely,
we track the concentration of confessional evidence by detainees and project the
legal significance of early access to lawyers, as well as the paucity of empirical
evidence for late confessions, undermining state arguments for extended detention. Part VI explores the dynamics of confession under interrogation for terrorist
detainees, giving rich detail on the tensions that invariably surface between legality demands and counter-insurgency imperatives. Our conclusion brings together
the themes of terrorism management, juridification, and the exposed tensions
between legality and counter-terrorism that manifest through the data presented.
Above all else, the data affords a rare insight into the sealed world of terrorismrelated interrogation and arrest in democracies, undoing presumptions and allowing some sacred cows to be demystified.
I. EMPIRICAL RESEARCH IN THE CONTEXT OF TERRORISM
This article examines some of these issues using original empirical data focusing on pre-trial stages in Northern Ireland’s “Diplock” court process. Diplock
courts were non-jury exceptional courts established to try scheduled (or terrorist
offenses) in 1972 as the conflict in Northern Ireland escalated and the courts
became a centerpiece of state conflict management strategies. The data addressed
here cover the time period 2000–2001 of the United Kingdom’s military, political, and legal engagement with paramilitary actors and groups, following the
signing and implementation of the Good Friday Agreement, also called the
Belfast Agreement, in 1998.9 We concentrated on this time period because prior
empirical work by Boyle, Hadden, Hillyard, and Walsh has illuminated significant patterns in the operation of non-jury courts from the early 1980’s onwards,10
and we sought to explore post-peace process data on the practice of detention,
interrogation, and trial in Northern Ireland. Thus, this work, using the same broad
data analysis and coding form builds on and extends previous empirical research
on exceptional courts in Northern Ireland. From the mid-1970s onwards, Diplock
courts (so called because their creation followed a recommendation by Lord

9. Agreement Reached in the Multi-Party Negotiations, UK–Ir., Apr. 10, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 751
[hereinafter Good Friday Agreement]. Such groups included the Irish Republican Army (IRA), the Irish
National Liberation Army (INLA), and the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF).
10. See, e.g., KEVIN BOYLE, TOM HADDEN & PADDY HILLYARD, LAW AND STATE: THE CASE OF
NORTHERN IRELAND (1975) [hereinafter LAW AND STATE].
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Diplock, a senior British judge),11 occupied a place of pride in British security
strategies in Northern Ireland. The state’s decision to utilize a criminal enforcement strategy in tandem with ongoing military containment strategies to address
the challenge of violent contenders is one that has been mirrored by other democracies both pre- and post-September 11, 2001.12
Instituted under emergency legislation,13 the status and procedure in the
Diplock courts followed that of Belfast’s main criminal court, with five critical
differences. First, the jury was dispensed with so that a single judge decided
questions of law and fact.14 Second, the jurisdiction of the courts was defined
in terms of “scheduled” offenses; these included typical terrorist-type offenses
(such as possession of explosives), but also other offenses – for instance
involving use of imitation firearms – which might be committed either by paramilitaries or by “Ordinary Decent Criminals” (ODCs) – a term infamously
used in contradistinction to “terrorists.”15 Third, the rules on admissibility of
confessions were relaxed so that some confessions that would ordinarily be
rejected under existing common law rules were made admissible.16 Fourth,
there were wider rights of appeal.17 Fifth, under the most recent version of the
Justice and Security (Northern Ireland) Act 2007, there is an important screening process by the Director of Public Prosecutions.18
In practice, the shift on admitting confessional evidence was linked to the
creation of three main interrogation facilities (that is, holding centers), the principal one of which was located at Castlereagh near the largest city in Northern
Ireland (Belfast), beginning in the early 1970s. The salient point is that an exceptional system was created generating its own dynamics. This involved arrest
and detention under exceptional/national security powers (typically under the
Prevention of Terrorism Acts (PTA), which allowed up to seven-day pre-charging

11. REPORT

OF THE

COMMISSION

TO CONSIDER LEGAL PROCEDURES TO DEAL WITH TERRORIST

ACTIVITIES IN NORTHERN IRELAND, 1972, Cmnd. 5185, at 3–4 (UK) [hereinafter DIPLOCK REPORT].

12. The governments of Spain, Germany, Canada, and others, for example, have combined the
efforts of a civil police force with those of military strategies to combat terrorism. See generally J.R.
Thackrah, Army-Police Collaboration Against Terrorism, 56 POLICE J. 41, 41 (1983) (noting that during
the conflict in Northern Ireland, the army functioned as a police force). The use of exceptional courts has
been a particular feature. See, e.g., GUANTÁNAMO AND BEYOND: EXCEPTIONAL COURTS AND MILITARY
COMMISSIONS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (Fionnuala Nı´ Aoláin & Oren Gross eds., 2013).
13. Walker, supra note 1, at 312.
14. DIPLOCK REPORT, supra note 11.
15. This term was memorialized by the Baker Report. THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NORTHERN
IRELAND, REVIEW OF THE OPERATION OF THE NORTHERN IRELAND (EMERGENCY PROVISIONS) ACT 1978,
1984, Cmnd. 9222 at ¶ 136 (UK).
16. See JOHN JACKSON & SEAN DORAN, JUDGE WITHOUT JURY: DIPLOCK TRIALS IN THE ADVERSARY
SYSTEM 57-58 (1995).
17. See John D. Jackson & Sean Doran, Conventional Trials in Unconventional Times: The Diplock
Court Experience, 4 CRIM. L.F. 503, 520 (1993).
18. Justice and Security (Northern Ireland) Act 2007, c. 6, § 1 (UK).
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detention)19 in de facto interrogation centers, questioning by dedicated police
teams under strong pressure to obtain confessions, and trial in Diplock courts, frequently based on confessions that might otherwise be inadmissible.20 Nascent
overlap between the open and closed state was already evident in the creation of
the courts and their attendant enabling system.
Northern Ireland’s ordinary criminal legal system continued to operate in
parallel, frequently processing comparable numbers of ODCs in jury trials.21
While such defendants would have been arrested and detained under ordinary
legal powers, these regular powers morphed in the course of the conflict to
reflect many of the essential contours of exceptional powers, opening up
broad challenges of legitimacy for the exceptional legal regime. Most notably, the Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1988 resulted in the
abrogation of the right to silence for paramilitary defendants in the jurisdiction, and Northern Ireland’s Police and Criminal Evidence Order 1989
(PACE (NI)) introduced four-day pre-charging detention (previously only
forty-eight hours were allowed),22 and altered rules on admissibility of confessions.23 The extension of this measure from the exceptional trial of persons
suspected of committing terrorist offenses to the trials of “ODCs” in
Northern Ireland, and ultimately to ordinary criminal defendants in England
is a prime example of a move from the ‘extra-ordinary’ to the ordinary in the
counter-terrorism context.
As Diplock courts have shifted from being dedicated vehicles for the trial of
suspected terrorists into becoming part of the regular legal system via legislation,
they bear notable comparison with the most recent generation of U.S. Military
Commissions.24 Of course, the very point of Diplock was to move away from a
“war on terror” model and to criminalize the actors engaged in politically
motivated violence, while the U.S. Military Commissions distinctly (though
ineptly) embraced the laws of war, and the juridical anchor of the war model for
the legitimacy of the trials.25 Importantly, at no point during Northern Ireland’s
conflict did the authorities deploy non-statutory judicial or quasi-judicial bodies

19. The 1974 PTA specifically allowed for up to 48 hours of pre-charging detention, but with the
caveat that the Secretary of State may extend the detention by up to five additional days. Prevention of
Terrorism (Temporary Provisions Act) 1974, c. 56, § 7(2) (UK).
20. See KEVIN BOYLE, TOM HADDEN & PATTY HILLYARD, TEN YEARS ON IN NORTHERN IRELAND:
THE LEGAL CONTROL OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE 49 (1980) [hereinafter TEN YEARS]; DERMOT WALSH,
COBDEN TRUST, THE USE AND ABUSE OF EMERGENCY LEGISLATION IN NORTHERN IRELAND 100 (1983).
21. Supporting data compiled from centralized database. See DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Northern Ireland
Courts and Tribunals Webpages, http://www.courtsni.gov.uk/en-gb/publications/archivedpublications/
pages/default.aspx (dataset on file with author).
22. Police and Criminal Evidence Order (Northern Ireland) 1989.
23. Clive Walker, The Bombs in Omagh and their Aftermath: The Criminal Justice (Terrorist and
Conspiracy) Act 1988, 62 MOD. L. R. 879, 883 (1999).
24. See Military Commissions Act of 2006, 10 U.S.C. §§ 948a–950t, 948b (2012) (authorizing the
use of military commissions for “violations of the laws of war, and other offenses . . .”).
25. See Laura K. Donohue, Terrorism and Trial by Jury: The Vices and Virtues of British and
American Criminal Law, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1322, 1341 (2007).
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corresponding to the first generation of Military Commissions established by
President Bush’s Executive Order on November 13, 2001. The British Government had employed similar non-statutory “military courts” to deal with insurgency
in Ireland in the early twentieth century.26 But, in an unheralded warning to the
Bush-era experience, these bodies became so legally entangled though lawyers
bringing multiple motions challenging them in the civil courts,27 that thereafter the
British abandoned the device. Ongoing challenges in the United States concerning
the legality, expediency, and fairness of the revised Military Commissions affirm
that ongoing and unrelenting judicial engagement mirrors the earlier British quagmire with no end in sight.28 Only statutory bodies were deployed in the various
counter-insurgency campaigns that marked the United Kingdom’s post-Second
World War period of decolonization.29 This meant that once it was decided in the
early 1970s to employ special courts in Northern Ireland, it was inevitable that
they would be statutory in authorization.30 The only real question was whether one
judge would sit alone, and if so, whether some system of assessors of fact would
be employed. As noted above, the simplest option was chosen: one judge with no
assessors.31
The data forming the basis of our analysis covers the post Good Friday/Belfast
peace Agreement phase of the Diplock system and no parallel or similar database
is available elsewhere. Focusing on this period has a number of advantages in
comparative terms. The first springs from its near contemporaneity with the post9/11 terrorism experienced by many states. The United Kingdom moved virtually
seamlessly from combating the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in Northern Ireland
prior to the peace process, to dealing with IRA splinter groups opposed to the 1998
peace agreement, to countering al Qaeda-oriented activities in the United Kingdom
(indeed one such latter case was tried in a Diplock court) to contemporary focused
ISIS challenges.32 This is not to suggest that all these violent actors can meaningfully be considered a manifestation of the single phenomenon of terrorism—the
26. See COLM CAMPBELL, EMERGENCY LAW IN IRELAND, 1918-1925 93 (1994).
27. Id. at 64.
28. See, e.g., In re Khalid Shaikh Mohammad, 866 F.3d 473 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (per curiam); In re
Khadr, 823 F.3d 92, 97 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2016); In re al-Nashiri 791 F.3d 71, 75–76 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
29. See generally BRIAN SIMPSON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE END OF EMPIRE (2004 ed. 2001)
(examining the role of human rights in administering new constitutions in the post-colonial era).
30. DIPLOCK REPORT, supra note 11, 8–9, ¶¶ 12–14.
31. The reasons for choice of only one judge seem to have been not only simplicity but, more
convincingly, security and practicality. See CLIVE WALKER, TERRORISM AND THE LAW 493–529 (2011)
(noting there were not enough NI judges to provide more than one judge per trial, and it was seen as
undesirable to bus in judges from Britain). Note that the Diplock Courts were finally closed in 2007. See
NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE, REPLACEMENT ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE DIPLOCK COURT SYSTEM: A
CONSULTATION PAPER 2 (2006), http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/politics/docs/nio/nio110806diplock.pdf
(noting that “Under the programme of security normalisation announced on 1 August 2005, the
legislation underpinning the Diplock system is due to be repealed on 31 July 2007.”).
32. See, e.g., LORD CARLILE, REPORT ON THE OPERATION IN 2001 OF THE TERRORISM ACT 2000
(2002); id. at Annex H (REPORT ON THE OPERATION IN 2001 OF PART VII OF THE TERRORISM ACT 2000);
LORD CARLILE, REPORT ON THE OPERATION IN 2002 OF PART VII OF THE TERRORISM ACT 2000 (2002);
LORD CARLILE, REPORT ON THE OPERATION IN 2002 AND 2003 OF THE TERRORISM ACT 2000 (2004).
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IRA had quite different targeting policies, structures, and goals from al Qaeda
and ISIS,33—but at a sufficiently high level of abstraction some transcending
issues surrounding the interrogation and trial of violent actors present themselves. These can then be analyzed though a nuanced, contextual understanding
of the actors, which is what this article seeks to do.
The second advantage of analyzing this data springs from the originality of focusing on the end phase of states of emergency.34 By emergency, we mean the
use of exceptional legal powers by the state to address a situation of crisis,
whether economic, political, or social in nature. The United Kingdom exercised
its prerogatives and derogated on a number of occasions from the European
Convention on Human Rights.35 As one of the authors has explored in depth elsewhere, the resort to derogation has been markedly absent from the United
Kingdom’s (and other states’) post-9/11 responses to terrorism.36 This article
allows us to explore arrest and interrogation practice as formal derogation practice is on the wane. Analysis of the norm-exception relationship has tended to
focus on the initial trajectory37—from norm to exception; our data as demonstrated in this article allows empirical examination of the opposite trajectory –
from exception to norm. Using official court records following from access given
by the Northern Ireland Court Service to the authors that recorded details of interrogation, access to lawyers, and of evidence, SPSS cross-tabulations were generated based on literature and/or inductive reasoning from the data to track the
process from initial arrest, through interrogation, charging, and trial in the immediate post Good Friday Agreement phase of the conflict in Northern Ireland.38 A
key and unique facet of this project is its longitudinal dimension, involving access
to approximately 400 individual cases of persons tried under national securityspecific provisions in U.K. law in cohorts from 1988 to 2001. To avoid confusion,
33. Compare TIM PAT COOGAN, THE IRA 38–47 (Palgrave 2002) (1970), with Daniel L. Byman, al
Qaeda’s M&A Strategy, BROOKINGS INST. (DEC. 7, 2010), https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/alqaedas-ma-strategy/ (discussing the recruitment, organization, and targeting policies of Al Qaeda); see
also Peter Taylor, Comparing the Evolution of IS and the IRA, BBC NEWS (Apr. 22, 2015), http://www.
bbc.com/news/uk-northern-ireland-32326431 (analyzing the similarities between the rise of ISIL and
the IRA).
34. See, e.g., Nicole Questiaux (Special Rapporteur), Econ. & Soc. Council (UN ESCOR), Study on
the Implications for Human Rights of Recent Developments Concerning Situations Known as States of
Siege or Emergency, UN Doc. E/CN. 4/Sub. 21982/15 (July 27, 1982); Committee on International
Terrorism, International Law Association Paris Conference (1984), 7 TERRORISM: AN INTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL 199 (2008).
35. See, e.g., Marshall v. United Kingdom, app. No. 41571/98, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2001), http://hudoc.
echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-5967; Brannigan and McBride v. United Kingdom, 258 Eur. Ct. H.R. 29 (ser. A)
(1993); Brogan and Others v. United Kingdom, 145 Eur. Ct. H.R. 11 (ser. A) (1988); Ireland v. United
Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1978).
36. Fionnuala Nı´ Aoláin, The Cloak and Dagger Game of Derogation, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN
EMERGENCIES 124 (Evan J. Criddle ed., 2016).
37. See, e.g., ANTONY JENNINGS, JUSTICE UNDER FIRE: THE ABUSE OF CIVIL LIBERTIES IN NORTHERN
IRELAND (1990); Conor Gearty, Terrorism and Human Rights: A Case Study in Impending Legal
Realities, 19 LEGAL STUD. 367 (1999); John Jackson, Many Years On in Northern Ireland: The Diplock
Legacy, 60 N. IR. LEGAL Q. 213 (2009).
38. Details of methodology are found in Appendix I: Methodology.
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the data presented in tabular form covers only the 2000–2001 cohorts, but key
points from the 1988–99 dataset are referenced as relevant in the text.
Unlike many jurisdictions that have resorted to the use of exceptional courts to
process terrorist crime, consistent empirical work in Northern Ireland through the
1970s and 1980s has detailed the patterns and influences on due process rights
and mechanisms, as the state increasingly relied on the legal process to address
the challenge of political and terrorist violence.39 The research strategy in this
project sought to ensure that the methodologies employed were compatible
with earlier studies of the Diplock courts,40 permitting future assessment of
their operation over a period of nearly four decades. This unique continuity of
data and analysis offers an important and under-explored opportunity to assess
the means by which the democratic state responds to terrorist actors and other
violent challenges; how rule of law institutions function in such circumstances;
and to draw broader theoretical conclusions (many counter-intuitive to prevailing orthodoxies).
The questions addressed in this article break down into two sets – the specific
and the conceptual. The specific questions in relation to pre-trial aspects of the
Diplock court system include:
＋ Who was interrogated?
＋ Did they have lawyers present?
＋ How extensive was the interrogation?
＋ Did they make confessions, and if so, when?
＋ Did the lawyers make any difference?
＋ To what extent were the state’s practices informed by the influence
of external oversight exercised by international courts and tribunals
and by the requirements of treaty obligations (requiring any measures taken to be compatible with human rights norms, or for the state
to make specific and justified derogations from those obligations)?41
The broader conceptual issues that the data set and its analysis raise include:
＋ What does state practice tell us about the viability of a sealed normexception antinomy?
＋ As the emergency declined, was there any evidence of hybridization
of the normal and the exceptional legal systems?

39. See BOYLE, HADDEN & HILLYARD, LAW AND STATE, supra note 10.
40. See, e.g., BOYLE, HADDEN & HILLYARD, TEN YEARS, supra note 20.
41. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 15,
Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. No. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
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＋ To what extent can the exception explored here demonstrate where
law plays a limited or perhaps a dampening role?
＋ In the longer term, as all these data sets are analyzed in tandem,
what does a longitudinal study over the entire length of a conflict
say about the role of legal institutions and the effect of legal culture
on a state’s resort to exceptional powers?
＋ What are the implications of our findings for states currently at the
forefront of the utilization of courts and custodial settings as a means
to contain or process terrorist actors and other violent challenges
and terrorists, notably the United Kingdom and the United States?
II. DEFENDANTS: WHO WAS TRIED BEFORE THE DIPLOCK COURTS?
If interrogation processes and trials are sites of contention between the state
and non-state actors, examination of the ages and backgrounds of defendants can
provide a snapshot of sorts of that interaction at a particular moment. This can
give clues about degrees of radicalization and mobilization of the state’s challengers, facilitating exploration of the complex interaction these are likely to
have with the state’s security apparatus.42 It may also offer clues as to how the
state might respond in multi-dimensional ways to the communities and individuals who may have a negative relationship with the state. This dynamic is all the
more pertinent given state attention to countering and preventing violent extremism, and the elusive search for effective strategies to identify those men (and
women) most at risk of being radicalized or engaged in politically-motivated violence.43 Thus, a fundamental component of the defendant profile analysis is the
extent to which the state’s legal system contributes to or dampens the mobilization of extremists.
What is striking about the data is that it shows that paramilitary defendants44
being charged under national security provisions have gotten significantly older
over time in the course of the Northern Ireland conflict. In the 2000–2001 study,
51 percent are 28 years of age and only 27 percent were under 22 years of age
(Table 1). This typology is true of both Republicans and Loyalists – that is, it cuts
42. See TED ROBERT GURR, WHY MEN REBEL (1970); Ted Robert Gurr, Why Minorities Rebel: A
Global Analysis of Communal Mobilization and Conflict Since 1945, 14 INT’L POL. SCI. REV. 161 (1993)
(discussing political protest and rebellion by communal groups); Campbell & Connolly, supra note 7
(discussing the mobilization of states’ violent challengers).
43. See, e.g., HM GOVERNMENT HOME OFFICE, PREVENT STRATEGY, 2011, Cm. 8092 (UK)
[hereinafter “PREVENT STRATEGY”]; Violent Radicalization and Homegrown Terrorism Prevention Act,
H.R. 1955, 110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007); EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,
EMPOWERING LOCAL PARTNERS TO PREVENT VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN THE UNITED STATES (2011)
(outlining President Obama’s counter-terrorism strategy at a local level).
44. A note on terminology – we refer variously in the study to paramilitary actors and also use the
term ‘terrorism’ as appropriate, in part to defer the broader and more complex engagement with the
dynamic of multiple actors in the conflict and to eschew the wholesale use of ‘terrorists’ terminology
that tends to heighten rather than minimize the perceived political import of the analysis.
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across paramilitary offenders on both side of the political divide. Defendants in
our 1988 cohort were younger, and a study of the Diplock Courts by Boyle,
Hadden and Hillyard in the 1970s found 60 percent aged 21 or under.45
This data compliments the data analysis of “ordinary” criminality, which
points to a decline in criminal participation as individuals get older.46 Here, the
personal costs of constant engagement with the criminal justice system, the experience of imprisonment, and the emotional tug from families and communities
have all been identified as significant elements in prompting behavioral change.
Why our data has a different hue is a puzzle, which we explain by reference to
state conflict management strategies as well social and psycho-social aspects
stemming from the specificity of mobilization to non-state paramilitary groups.
Whether this pattern holds for all terrorist organizations over time requires further
empirical analysis.
Our data is consistent with, but does not prove, the hypothesis that the state’s
de-escalation of its security strategies from circa 1990 had the effect of curbing
the kind of cycles of radicalization and violent mobilization evident earlier in the
conflict.47 In other words, if there was a nexus between state repression and violence, we suggest that curbing the repression also had the effect of lessening the
supply of younger recruits to paramilitary groups. This particular point has clear
contemporary resonance, as pervasive security concerns about radical recruitment to al Qaeda, ISIS (and other Islamic groups) are shaping security thinking
and initiatives across multiple spheres (for example, foreign policy and national
security).48 In the United Kingdom this concern has sparked multiple policies
from key government departments, with little indication of its grounding in empirical data.49
One might also posit that the data reflects the increased sophistication of
paramilitary groups that, given the growing capabilities of state security forces,
realized that the effective conduct of their campaigns required trained and
45. BOYLE, HADDEN AND HILLYARD, LAW AND STATE, supra note 10, at 23 table 3.2, See also,
Campbell & Connolly supra note 7, at 358.
46. Jeffery T. Ulmer & Darrell Steffensmeier, The Age and Crime Relationship Social Variation,
Social Explanation, in THE NURTURE VERSUS BIOSOCIAL DEBATE IN CRIMINOLOGY: ON THE ORIGINS OF
CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR AND CRIMINALITY (Kevin M. Beaver, J.C. Barnes & Brian B. Boutwell eds. 2015).
47. See, e.g., J. BOWYER BELL, THE SECRET ARMY: A HISTORY OF THE IRA 1916–1970 (1970).
48. See, e.g., FARHAD KHOSROKHAVAR, RADICALIZATION: WHY SOME PEOPLE CHOOSE THE PATH OF
VIOLENCE (Jane Marie Todd trans., 2017); WILLEM KOOMEN & JOOP VAN DER PLIGT, THE PSYCHOLOGY
OF RADICALIZATION AND TERRORISM (2015); Mary Beth Altier & John Horgan, The Future of Terrorist
De-Radicalization Programs, 13 GEO. J. INT’L AFF., Spring/Summer 2012, at 83 (2012); Khouwaga
Yusoufzai & Franziska Emmerling, How Identity Crisis, Relative Depravation, Personal Characteristics,
and Empathy Contribute to the Engagement of Western Individuals in Islamist Terrorist Behavior, 8 J.
TERRORISM RES. 68 (2017).
49. See, e.g., PREVENT STRATEGY, supra note 43 (detailing the United Kingdom’s counter-extremism
strategy, including efforts to prevent radicalization); HOME OFFICE, PREVENTING EXTREMISM TOGETHER:
PLACES OF WORSHIP (2005) (UK); HM GOVERNMENT HOME OFFICE, COUNTERING INTERNATIONAL
TERRORISM: THE UNITED KINGDOM’S STRATEGY, 2006, Cm. 6888 (UK). For an assessment of age (and
other) factors underpinning the recruitment of al Qaeda offenders, see HANNAH STUART, THE HENRY
JACKSON SOC’Y, ISLAMIST TERRORISM: KEY FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS (2017).
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Table 1. Defendants: Age & Background 2000-2001
Age of Defendant

19 or under

Row %

Background

Loyalist

20–22

23–25

Row %

26–27

Row %

28 1

Row %

Total

Row %

Col %

14

15%

13

14%

12

13%

8

9%

45

49%

92

72%

Republican

3

10%

4

13%

6

19%

1

3%

17

55%

31

24%

Security Forces

0

0%

1

25%

0

0%

0

0%

3

75%

4

3%

Other (ODC)

0

0%

0

0%

0

0%

0

0%

0

0%

0

0%

17

13%

18

14%

18

14%

9

7%

65

51%

127

100%

Total

experienced operatives. We think this is less likely given the finite supply of volunteers to paramilitary organizations and our view that the paramilitary organizations did not have great capacity to regulate their supply of volunteers. The age
dimension is also useful to interrogate assumptions that pervade scholarly and
policy debates concerning the ‘typical’ or average profile (including age) of likely
offenders with the supposition that the most likely group of men to engage in
politically motivated violence are young. This assumption has a reach across
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multiple contexts such as the use of profiling patterns in ‘stop and search’ measures,50 and other arenas of direct interface between communities perceived as vulnerable to radicalization and the state.
The data also suggest that mobilization does not age out, and the commitment
to ideology and to certain political goals is secured in ways that make sustained
engagement throughout a lifetime a predictable feature. Moreover, individuals in
our study are located in families and communities that may broadly support and
solidify the political objectives being articulated, thereby providing sustained
encouragement to imprisoned or militarily active individuals, in ways that are distinct and different from regular criminal activity. These communities may also be
under the most sustained policing and military engagement by the state, complicating the ‘push-pull’ factors that lead to sustained mobilization into political
violence.
Placing the data in historical context permits us to observe that a fundamental
shift has occurred in the profile of the average paramilitary offender in Northern
Ireland. The data relate to a time period in which a major peace agreement (the
Good Friday/Belfast Agreement) had been signed between the primary protagonists to the conflict,51 though with considerable dissention from both political
constituencies – the Loyalist political and paramilitary groupings and dissident
Republican groups.52 Yet, the contours of the defendants’ profile follows that of
changing power relationships following the Good Friday Agreement. Prior to the
Agreement, a majority of defendants had been Republicans—suspected IRA
operatives.53 What is striking about our data set is that Loyalists now outnumber
Republicans nearly 3:1 in terms of who is being arrested for offenses covered by
the Prevention of Terrorism Acts. Most of the Loyalist defendants were charged
with public order offenses, generally those involving street protests and other
forms of violent assembly.54 In general, the context for such public street-based

50. In the United Kingdom, for example, the use of Terrorism Act powers to stop and search suspects
resulted in a dramatic increase in the ethnic profiling of young minorities. See RUNNYMEDE
PERSPECTIVES, ETHNIC PROFILING: THE USE OF “RACE” IN UK LAW ENFORCEMENT 7 (Kjartan Páll
Sveinsson ed., 2010) (“The massive increase in stop and search recently has – unsurprisingly – affected
minority ethnic young people to a far greater extent than their white peers.”).
51. See Good Friday Agreement, supra note 9. For a comprehensive analysis of the Good Friday
Agreement, see Volume 22(4) (1999) of the Fordham Journal of International Law, which features 28
articles and essays analyzing Northern Ireland’s peace process. 22 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1136, 1136–
1906 (1999). See also LEE A. SMITHEY, UNIONISTS, LOYALISTS, AND CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION IN
NORTHERN IRELAND (2011) (providing a case study of the communities after the signing of the
agreement).
52. A number of groups do not observe a ceasefire status, including the Real IRA which called off its
ceasefire in 2000. Cf. POLICE SERVICE OF NORTHERN IRELAND, POLICE RECORDED SECURITY SITUATION
STATISTICS: ANNUAL REPORT COVERING THE PERIOD 1ST APRIL 2016 – 31 MARCH 2017 (2017), https://
www.psni.police.uk/globalassets/inside-the-psni/our-statistics/security-situation-statistics/2017/annualsecurity-situation-statistics-report-2016-17.pdf (discussing a rise in security incidents in the early
2000s).
53. Cf. BOYLE, HADDEN & HILLYARD, LAW AND STATE, supra note 10, at 23 table 3.2.
54. See generally CAROLYN GALLAHER, LOYALIST PARAMILITARIES IN POST-ACCORD NORTHERN
IRELAND (2007). Unresolved issues from the Belfast Agreement led to rioting and violence on multiple
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contestation arose from protests against newly synchronized administrative provisions. These measures called for the regulation of religious and political
marches in Northern Ireland, an aspect of public political identity most associated
with Loyalist groups, a manifesto that emerged decisively from the peace process.55 These data point to a transformation in which groups and individuals are
likely to challenge the state, and counter-intuitively affirm that peace agreements
may not in fact deliver fully peaceful outcomes in the short to medium term.
Rather, spoilers, oppositional organizations and new forms of mobilization may
be part of the transitional landscape. The legal and political terrain may remain
complex but in differently textured ways.
Another notable point is that the legal system in the period under review
became more narrowly focused on politically-motivated offenses. At earlier
points in the conflict, one of the major legal criticisms of terrorism legislation and
its enforcement was directed at the practice of sweeping up persons who were not
associated with terrorist violence, a practice enabled by the broad definitions of
crimes contained in the Prevention of Terrorism Acts and the Emergency Powers
Acts (for example, use of a firearm would automatically define a crime as being
‘terrorist’ in nature, even if it were used in ordinary crime).56 Moreover, legal
changes have bolstered this move with successive modifications to both the list of
scheduled offenses and also discretion in filtering out those who formally fall
within the list.57 This finding is illustrated by the nil return on what have been
euphemistically termed “ODCs”. In our data, ODCs are not appearing in the nonjury court system, hence a 0 percent return. In a relevant 1980 study ODCs were
appearing in the Diplock courts at a 40 percent rate,58 and in the 1988 data set,
ODCs were present at a rate of 20 percent.
This finding confirmed our intuition that the screening out of ODCs over time
from the Diplock courts illuminates some of the complexity of the norm-exceptional antimony in prolonged emergencies. Specifically, while there are examples
of hybridization (for example, the abrogation of the right to silence), practice can
also run in the other direction. There was sustained pressure domestically from
NGOs and civil society and internationally from human rights bodies to remove
ODCs from Diplock courts. ODC’s presence in the exceptional legal system was
a legitimacy challenge for the state, pointing to flawed procedural fairness and to
the costs of exceptionality for the integrity of the ordinary law. The “fix” was
occasions. In 2013, for example, violence erupted following a decision to fly the Union Flag on
designated days only—as opposed to every day. The resulting Haass-O’Sullivan talks failed to result in
a consensus. See Gerry Adams, Lessons from the Irish Peace Process, 16 GEO. J. INT’L AFF. 218, 218–
20 (2015).
55. Kevin Hearty, The Great Awakening? The Belfast Flag Protests and Protestant/Unionist/Loyalist
Counter-Memory in Northern Ireland 30 IRISH POLITICAL STUDIES 157 (2015)
56. See Dermot Walsh, Erasing the Distinction Between Anti-Terrorist and Criminal Justice
Measures in Ireland, in COUNTER-TERRORISM, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE RULE OF LAW: CROSSING
LEGAL BOUNDARIES IN DEFENSE OF THE STATE 212–237 (Aniceto Masferrer & Clive Walker eds.,
2013).
57. See WALKER, TERRORISM AND THE LAW, supra note 31, at 493–529.
58. For data points see WALSH, supra note 20, at 80-82.
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relatively simple (enabling an effective de-scheduling mechanism). Moreover, the
narrative of the costs to the individual ODC defendant portrayed the system as
opposed to the basic protection of individual liberty, a virtue the democratic state
was anxious to maintain. Overall, however, one has to view the sealing off of the
Diplock system from ODCs as telling only a partial story of norm-exceptional
antinomy, as other practices from the Diplock courts migrated to the ordinary law,
even as the cohort of defendants within the system appeared more uniform over
time.
III. ARREST AND EXCEPTIONALISM
In our 2000–2001 data set there was, at most, one arrest by the Army or in joint
Army/Police operations (Table 2). Earlier studies of arrest patterns undertaken
during the middle period of the conflict found 11 percent of arrests across both
categories (solely or jointly by the Army).59 This data reflects fundamental shifts
as to which actors are dominating the management of conflict, over the course of
the life-cycle of conflict space. If military presence in a conflict space generally
co-relates with the intensive and extra-ordinary phase of conflict regulation, this
data set again points to the malleability and trajectory of conflict regulation from
exceptional to regularization.
In Northern Ireland a politically agreed upon process of demilitarization took
place after 1998.60 This process included early release of persons serving prison
terms for crimes defined as “terrorist” (under the PTA or EPA), essentially a de
jure amnesty,61 as well as an internationally monitored process of demilitarization
that destroyed significant quantities of weapons and explosive materials.62 In the
same context, the deployment of the British army was substantially scaled back,63
and the police took over and civilianized a range of functions that had, to that
59. Id. at 36.
60. See Good Friday Agreement, supra note 9, at Strand Three: Decommissioning. The most recent
document related to the decommissioning of military and paramilitary weapons was published in
November 2015. See N. IR. EXEC., A FRESH START: THE STORMONT AGREEMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION
PLAN (2015), https://www.northernireland.gov.uk/publications/fresh-start-stormont-agreement-andimplementation-plan-0.
61. It is fair to say that the status of release as a form of amnesty is contestable. A de facto amnesty
occurs typically when nothing is done, no investigations or trials are pursued, the state acts as if the
crimes did not take place. A de jure amnesty is different as there is a legal framework setting out an
exceptional decision not to prosecute specific categories of crimes and offenders. The Early Release
Scheme may be viewed as different again as the beneficiaries were convicted, those convictions
remained on their record and they were released on license. See generally LOUISE MALLINDER,
AMNESTY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND POLITICAL TRANSITIONS: BRIDGING THE PEACE AND JUSTICE DIVIDE 37
(2008) (explaining the differences between decisions to grant amnesty).
62. See Good Friday Agreement, supra note 49, at Annex B, Prisoners, ¶¶ 1, 5; MALLINDER, supra
note 61, at 157–58.
63. Operation Banner ended in 2007. The official review is Army Code 71842. Page 7-1 has troop
numbers reflected for the totality of the conflict. See CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF, ARMY OF THE
UNITED KINGDOM, OPERATION BANNER: AN ANALYSIS OF MILITARY OPERATION IN NORTHERN IRELAND,
(2007), http://www.vilaweb.cat/media/attach/vwedts/docs/op_banner_analysis_released.pdf; see also
ANDREW SANDERS & IAN S. WOOD, TIMES OF TROUBLES: BRITAIN’S WAR IN NORTHERN IRELAND vi–vii
(2012) (citing the military levels of engagement during the conflict).
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Table 2. Who Made the Arrests?
Arrestor (note: RUC is used for Royal Ulster Constabulary)

Defendant

Uniformed

Plainclothes

RUC Alone

RUC Alone

Other

Not Known

Count

Row %

Count

Row %

Count

Row %

Count

Loyalist

55

59.8%

34

37.0%

1

1.1%

2

Republican

25

80.6%

6

19.4%

0

0%

0

0%

0

0%

0

80

63.0%

40

31.5%

1

Row %

Total

Count

Row %

2.2%

92

72.4%

0

0%

31

24.4%

0%

4

100.0%

4

3.1%

8%

6

4.7%

127

100.0%

Background

Security
Forces

Total

point, required close military support. This pattern of handover has some contemporary resonance in Iraq and Afghanistan, though it is worth noting the distinctions that pertain to the higher degree of effective security control in Northern
Ireland. In Iraq and Afghanistan, British and American forces made local police
and military units responsible for the front-line engagement with terrorist
groups,64 as well as signalling a shift from external to internal control of law

64. See, e.g., ANTONIA CHAYES, BORDERLESS WARS: CIVIL MILITARY DISORDER AND LEGAL
UNCERTAINTY 25–58 (2015) (discussing the United States Counterinsurgency Strategy and the handover
of local control of military forces in Iraq and Afghanistan); see also BUREAU OF POLITICAL-MILITARY
AFFAIRS, DEP’T OF STATE, U.S. GOVERNMENT COUNTERINSURGENCY GUIDE (2009), https://www.state.
gov/documents/organization/119629.pdf (outlining United States military policy related to containing
and addressing the root causes of insurgent activities in military zones); Travers B. Child, We Don’t
Need No Education: Reconstruction and Conflict across Afghanistan, HOUSEHOLDS IN CONFLICT
NETWORK (Feb. 2017), http://www.hicn.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/HiCN-WP-244.pdf
(examining the status of the military led reconstructions in Afghanistan and Iraq).
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enforcement. In practice, this has been much less successful than anticipated,65 in
part because of the lack of a comprehensive and inclusive political settlement
involving all major political and military factions in both countries.
The arrest patterns and the primacy of the police in the latter phases of the conflict in Northern Ireland demonstrate an embedding normality as the system
moves towards greater formal rationality in its practices. On the one hand this
may appear as a move away from exceptionality, but the shift to police-led antiterrorism practice must also account for the marked militarization of the police
over time, a direct result of a militarized conflict. This shift towards formal rationality is also evident from exploring the regimes governing detention. While 63
percent of persons are arrested (and subsequently detained) under what could be
termed a counter-terrorist regime, 30 percent are held under the ordinary law provisions of the Police and Criminal Evidence Order, ordinary criminal law in the
jurisdiction (Table 3).
In parallel with changes to the exceptional regime governing detention (principally the Prevention of Terrorism Acts (PTAs) and the Northern Ireland
(Emergency Provisions) Acts (EPAs),66 during the course of the conflict the ordinary law on detention was also recast in a way that brought it more into line with
the exceptional legal system. Notably, much of this legislation was introduced
and gained parliamentary approval on the basis that it had specific purview over
the particular circumstances and challenges of terrorism. In reality, the changes
had sizeable effects on the operation of the ordinary criminal justice system.
There are obvious parallels to the Congressional debates concerning the passage
of the USA PATRIOT Act.67 The ordinary law now provided for 4-day detention

65. See, e.g., Patrick Porter, Last Charge of the Knights? Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Special
Relationship, 86 INT’L AFF. 355, 368 (2010) (citing the infiltration of the al-Sadr militia force in the
British-trained Basra police force); Seth G. Jones, The Rise of Afghanistan’s Insurgency: State Failure
and Jihad, 32 INT’L SEC. Q., Spring 2008, at 7, 17 (explaining the risk of infiltration by insurgent forces
for local police forces in Afghanistan).
66. E.g., The Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1984, c. 8 (superseded) (UK); The
Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989, c. 4 (repealed) (UK); The Prevention of
Terrorism (Additional Powers) Act 1996, c.7 (UK); Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1974,
c. 56 (UK); Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1978, c. 8 (UK) (repealed 1991).
67. Section 412 of the PATRIOT Act requires that the Attorney General shall detain any alien who is
suspected of terrorism and that the alien remain in custody until he/she is removed from the United
States. See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept
and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107–56, § 412, 115 Stat. 272, 350–
52 (2001). Under the provisions of this section, the Attorney General can decide to continue detaining
the individual for a period of up to six months if the “release of the alien will threaten the national
security of the United States.” Id. The provisions in the PATRIOT Act differ from other immigration
statutes authorizing mandatory detention because they broaden the definition of terrorism to include
anyone who provides material support to an organization if that person knew or reasonably should have
known that their activity would support a designated terrorist organization or any organization that
engages in terrorist activity. See id. at §411(a)(1)(F)–(G). This essentially means that anyone who has
had any connection to a terrorist organization, whether or not they participated in terroristic activities, is
deportable under the PATRIOT Act. David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 953, 967 (2002). This
broad definition means that any association with a terrorist organization could result in detention and

384

JOURNAL OF NATIONAL SECURITY LAW & POLICY

[Vol. 9:367

Table 3. Arrest Power Used
Arrest Power Used

Defendant

S.14 PTA 1989

Art26 PACE (NI) Order

(7-day)

1989 (4-day power)

Other

Not known

Count

Row %

Count

Row %

Count

Row %

Count

Loyalist

57

62.0%

31

33.7%

4

Republican

23

74.2%

7

22.6%

0

0%

1

4

100.0%

0

8

6.3%

1

Row %

Total

Count

Row %

92

100.0%

31

100.0%

4

100.0%

127

100.0%

Background

Security

0

0%

0

0%

4.3%

0

0%

3.2%

0%

Forces

Total

80

63.0%

38

29.9%

.8%

without charge,68 and also introduced new rules for the admissibility of confessions, and for access to lawyers. These restrictions were applied across the board
on the “right to silence,” the United Kingdom equivalent to Miranda warnings.69
Therefore, while the trajectory in this sample is from the exception to the norm,
that ‘norm’ is one that has been reshaped in a way that to a degree mirrors the
exceptional.

subsequent deportation. Id. at 966–72. See, e.g., 147 CONG. REC. S11,004 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 2001)
(statement of Sen. Leahy).
68. The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, c. 60, § 44 (3)(b) (UK).
69. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444–45 (1966); T.E. St. Johnson, Judges’ Rules and
Police Interrogation in England Today, 57 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 85, 86-88 (1964)
(noting the formation of judicial policy relating to a right to remain silent during police interrogation
within the Judges’ Rules of 1912 and 1918); The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, c. 60, §§ 6667 (UK) (directing the creation of codes of practice for police procedures including interrogation); Reid
v. Howard (1995) 184 CLR 1, 8 (Austl.).
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The complexity of two detention regimes operating in parallel, with both feeding into Diplock trials, raises questions of legal hybridity that are explored further
below. At this point, what can be noted is that ordinary law, specifically PACE
(NI) provisions are more likely to have been used against Loyalists (23 percent)
than against Republicans (32 percent), because the former were more heavily
involved in public order disturbances. Interestingly, statistics in England and
Wales follow the same trend. In recent years, most terrorist suspects have been
arrested under PACE and not the Terrorism Act.70 There may be several reasons
for this pattern. First, police forces in the United Kingdom mainland may have
greater familiarity with PACE provisions: this is what they use regularly and
understand best. Second, there may be uncertainty whether the suspect is a terrorist or an ODC, and conservative policing might prefer the ordinary law over the
exceptional in the context of uncertainty. The third factor may be the unavailability of police bail under the Terrorism Act.71 In sum, these statistics reveal the fluidity of charging practices post-conflict with some distinct differences from the
conflict period, and some stasis in other respects.
IV: CONTENTIOUS ZONES: INTO THE INTERROGATION CENTER
Post-arrest data are best contextualized in terms of the contested history of
interrogation and detention in Northern Ireland, which can partly be considered a
struggle for the juridification of the interrogation room. The juridification struggle
occurs in all interrogation rooms but is particularly pronounced in democratic
states, struggling to manage terrorism by law. The juridification of that contested
space mirrors a broader tension between a war-versus-criminal model of conflict
control, a debate with ongoing contemporary resonance.72 This tension manifests
both politically and legally and in turn entails a battle between the secret and the
open state. Invoking this tension between the open and secret state is wellrehearsed.73 This article’s contribution is to expose the specificity of that tension
in the highly ritualized and closed space of the interrogation room.

70. See Home Office, Operation of police powers under the Terrorism Act 2000 and subsequent
legislation: arrests, outcomes and stops and searches, quarterly update 30 September 2013, Great
Britain, GOV.UK (Mar. 6, 2014), https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/operation-of-policepowers-under-the-terrorism-act-2000-quarterly-update-to-september-2013/operation-of-police-powersunder-the-terrorism-act-2000-and-subsequent-legislation-arrests-outcomes-and-stops-and-searchesquarterly-update-to-30-s.
71. Terrorism Act 2000, c. 11, ¶ 67 (UK), amended by Terrorism (Northern Ireland) Act 2006, c. 4, §
5(2)–(3), sched. (UK) (denying bail under scheduled offenses unless detainee is admitted to bail by a
judge of the High Court or the Court of Appeal, or by the judge of the court of trial on adjourning the
trial of such person).
72. See, e.g., Jude McCulloch & Sharon Pickering, Pre-Crime and Counter-Terrorism: Imagining
Future Crime in the “War on Terror,” 49 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 628 (2009).
73. There is a substantial and varied literature on the notion of the “open” and “closed” state
particularly in the context of national security infrastructure. See, e.g., AMY B. ZEGART, FLAWED BY
DESIGN: THE EVOLUTION OF THE CIA, JCS, AND NSC (1999); DAVID R. RUDGERS, CREATING THE
SECRET STATE: THE ORIGINS OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, 1943–1947 (2000).
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Northern Ireland in the early 1970s was characterized by significant lawlessness as the state responded to the breakdown of the rule of law, intertwined with
the emergence of what has variously been described as low-level armed conflict,
terrorism, and extreme criminality.74 In parallel with post-9/11 practices, state
abuse of persons in detention figured prominently—resulting in well-documented
allegations of what could be termed “torture lite,”75 and “torture heavy.”76 The
late 1970s saw a police-based interrogation process in Northern Ireland for suspected terrorist offenders (with interrogators coming from the regular Criminal
Investigation Department (CID)), rather than the Special Branch (intelligence
operatives).77 While ordinary policing management of arrest and detention
for ODCs was more closely regulated, sustained legal challenges ultimately
produced evidence of institutional and individual lawlessness.78 Sustained
criticisms from international oversight bodies (including the United Nations
Committee Against Torture (UNCAT) and the European Committee Against
Torture (EuroCAT)),79 contributed to an increase in safeguards: video and then
audio-recording,80 the introduction of provisions allowing defendants conditional
access to lawyers,81 and the appointment of an Independent Commissioner for the

74. See, e.g., BOYLE, HADDEN & HILLYARD, TEN YEARS, supra note 20; BRENDAN O’LEARY & JOHN
MCGARRY, THE POLITICS OF ANTAGONISM: UNDERSTANDING NORTHERN IRELAND (1993); CLIVE
WALKER, THE PREVENTION OF TERRORISM IN BRITISH LAW (1986).
75. See, e.g., Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 41, 66 (1978) (holding that the
interrogation techniques utilized by the Government of the United Kingdom, specifically hooding,
prolonged noise exposure, sleep deprivation, reduced diet, and long periods of standing in painful
postures, caused “at least intense physical and mental suffering and led to acute psychiatric
disturbances,” and amounted to inhuman treatment in violation of Article 3 of the Convention); see also
Ireland v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5310/71, 1978 Y.B. Eur. Conv. On H.R. 602, 604–06 (Eur. Ct. H.
R.) (providing a summary of the same case).
76. See generally Donnelly v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 5577/72, 1973 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R.
212, 212–16 (Eur. Comm’n on H.R.) (addressing allegations of torture that included beatings on the
head, body, and genitals, the administration of electric shocks to the genitals, and the administration of
psychiatric drugs meant to induce confessions). Note that in Donnelly, the Commission held that in
proving systemic human rights violations, “administrative practices” includes only tolerance of brutality
and ill-treatment at the highest levels of government. See id. at 234–48. In practice, this threshold is very
difficult to reach.
77. See, e.g., Jon Moran, Evaluating Special Branch and the Use of Informer Intelligence in Northern
Ireland, 25 J. INTEL. & NAT’L SECURITY 1 (2010).
78. See, e.g., Fox v. United Kingdom, App. No. 12244/86, 182 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1990), 13 Eur.
H.R. Rep. 157; COMMITTEE ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, SUBMISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS
COMMITTEE AGAINST TORTURE (1991), https://caj.org.uk/1991/11/16/s002-submission-united-nationscommittee-torture/. For other pertinent policy papers and briefs by the Committee on the Administration
of Justice dealing with police practices in Northern Ireland in the 1980s and 1990s, see generally
COMMITTEE ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF Justice, https://caj.org.uk.
79. See Brice Dickson, Northern Ireland’s Emergency Legislation – The Wrong Medicine?, 1992
PUB. L. 592, 602 n.58 (discussing hearings held by UNCAT into allegations of torture at detention
centers in Northern Ireland).
80. See The Police and Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1989, SI 1989/1341 (N. Ir. 12)
art. 60-60A.
81. Id. at art. 59.
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Holding Centers who would serve as a “watchdog.”82
In Northern Ireland, exceptionality extended not only to the legal architecture,
but also to the physical structures. Interrogation sites are rarely oases of calm. As
has been clear from U.S. experience in the War on Terror, the interrogation sites’
construction may constitute not simply a physical space, but it may also be an integral part of the process.83 Prolonged deprivation of daylight, fluctuations in heat
and cold, noises, vibrations and surroundings that provoke disorientation and discomfort, may raise detainee stress levels and increase depression, making the
detainee more susceptible to interrogators’ strategies.84 The site almost inevitably
becomes the location of legal contestation.85 For the United Kingdom, contestation was engaged by international human rights treaty obligations. This created a
pathway to argue that the process of interrogation violated the prohibitions on torture, inhuman and degrading treatment.86
Castlereagh Holding Center was the prime destination for detainees in
Northern Ireland arrested under the Prevention of Terrorism Acts. As an official
watchdog described the site, “physical conditions . . . are, to employ moderate
82. See Owen Bowcott, The Unexpected Visitor: The Appointment of Sir Louis Blom-Cooper QC to
the New Post of Independent Commissioner for Northern Ireland’s Paramilitary Holding Centres Has
Received a Guarded Welcome, THE GUARDIAN, Apr. 27, 1993, at 1, ProQuest, Doc. ID 293428411.
83. See, e.g., Charlie Savage, Camp X-Ray: A Ghost Prison, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 1, 2014), https://www.
nytimes.com/interactive/2014/09/01/us/Guantánamo-camp-x-ray-ghost-prison-photographs.html; see also
Carol Rosenberg, Lawyers Postpone Guantánamo Testimony from CIA’S First ‘Black Site” Prisoner, MIAMI
HERALD (Mar. 20, 2017), http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/Guanta´namo/
article139657118.html; Carol Rosenberg, Guantánamo Hearing Halted by Supposed CIA “Black Site”
Worker Serving as War Court Linguist, MIAMI HERALD (Feb. 9, 2015), http://www.miamiherald.com/news/
nation-world/world/americas/Guantánamo/article9600110.html; Jane Mayer, The Black Sites: A Rare Look
Inside the C.I.A.’s Secret Interrogation Program, THE NEW YORKER (Aug. 13, 2007), http://www.
newyorker.com/magazine/2007/08/13/the-black-sites. The issues of detention remain heavily contested in
Military Commission pre-trial litigation, noting for example the ongoing litigation in the case of Khalid
Shaikh Mohammad, Walid Muhammad Salih Mubarak Bin’Attash, Ramzi Binalshibh, Ali Abdul Aziz Ali,
and Mustafa Ahmed Adam al Hawsawi, including defense motions to recuse the military judge and current
prosecution team based on the behaviors and actions of both in the destruction of a black site in which it is
believed detainees were held and subject to torture. Appellate Exhibit 425 (Mohammad), Mr. Mohammad’s
Motion To Recuse Military Judge and the Current Prosecution Team, United States v. Mohammad (Mil.
Comm’ns Trial Judiciary May 10, 2016), http://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/pdfs/KSM2/KSM%20II%20
(AE425(KSM)).pdf?ver=2016-05-27-113904-540; http://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/pdfs/KSM2/KSM%20II
%20(AE425(KSM)).pdf?ver=2016-05-27-113904-540; see also Appellate Exhibit 425J, Government
Notice at 1, United States v. Mohammad (Mil. Comm’ns Trial Judiciary July 8, 2016), http://www.mc.mil/
Portals/0/pdfs/KSM2/KSM%20II%20(AE425J(Gov)).pdf, (attaching as an exhibit Bin al-Shibh v. Obama,
No. 06-1725 (D.D.C. May 7, 2012), in which Judge Sullivan allowed the destruction of the site in question
following the preservation of evidence through alternative methods, like digital and photographic
preservation).
84. Cf. Memorandum for John Rizzo, Acting General Counsel of the CIA (Aug. 1, 2002), https://
www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/legacy/2010/08/05/memo-bybee2002.pdf (discussing the loud
noises that result from a technique known as “walling”).
85. In the context of U.S. post-9/11 practices, see, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 771
(2008); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 594 (2006); Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84, 98 (D.C.
Cir. 2010); Rasul v. Myers, 512 F.3d 644, 650 (D.C. Cir. 2008), vacated, Rasul v. Myers, 555 U.S. 1083
(2008).
86. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Fourth
Geneva Convention) art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
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language, austere and forbidding.”87 Thirty cells provided detainee accommodation, each with a floor area of 6.25 square metres, and furnished with a bed and
chair. Following a complaint by another human rights watchdog, bedding, which
had apparently been quite poor, was improved.88 Cells were window-less, lit by
artificial light that was dimmed at night but never turned off. There were no
clocks, and no reading or writing materials were allowed. The European
Committee for the Prevention of Torture found in its 1994 report that the “ventilation system appeared to function only moderately well and created a rather intrusive level of noise in certain cells.”89
From the moment of her arrival at the interrogation center, the detainee became
the responsibility of the facility’s uniformed staff. The staff opened a custody record and subjected the detainee to a thorough search in which personal possessions (including watches) were removed for the duration of her stay. The staff
could take the detainee’s clothes for forensic examination, in which case they
provided government-issued clothes (generally known as a “space suit”). Under a
statutory code introduced under the Emergency Provisions Act,90 detainees were
to be provided with notices detailing their [conditional] rights to have someone
informed of their arrest, their rights of access to a legal counsel, and the main provisions of the Criminal Evidence (NI) Order 1989 (which relates to abrogation of
the right to silence, an issue examined below). The next stage was a medical examination carried out in the interrogation center’s medical surgery center by an
officially appointed doctor. Once the examination was completed, the detainee
was taken to her cell from which she might later be moved to an interview room.
Castlereagh had a total of twenty-one interview rooms, broken up into a group
of thirteen rooms adjacent to the cells, and a group of either rooms in a separate
building. The rooms in the larger group measured six square meters, and were fitted with a table and three chairs. As with the cells, there was no natural light – it
appears that outside windows were covered in plywood – and no clocks. The
other interview rooms were somewhat bigger and benefited from some sunlight.
There were no facilities for exercise either indoors or outdoors. As the European
Committee for the Prevention of Torture noted of the conditions, “[a]ll these factors contributed to create a distinctly claustrophobic atmosphere.”91
87. SIR LOUIS BLOM-COOPER QC, FIRST ANNUAL (1993) REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT
COMMISSIONER FOR THE HOLDING CENTRES 32 (1994) (N. Ir.) [hereinafter FIRST ANNUAL BLOM-COOPER
REPORT].
88. HELSINKI WATCH & THE PRISON PROJECT, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, PRISON CONDITIONS IN THE
UNITED KINGDOM 8-10 (1992), https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/UK926.PDF; see
HELSINKI WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, CHILDREN IN NORTHERN IRELAND: ABUSED BY SECURITY
FORCES AND PARAMILITARIES 16 (1992).
89. EUROPEAN COMMITTEE FOR THE PREVENTION OF TORTURE AND INHUMAN OR DEGRADING
TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT, REPORT TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM ON THE VISIT TO
NORTHERN IRELAND CARRIED OUT BY THE EUROPEAN COMMITTEE FOR THE PREVENTION OF TORTURE
AND INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT FROM 20 TO 29 JULY 1993, ¶ 40 (1994).
90. Cf. Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1973 c. 53, sch. 1 (UK).
91. EUROPEAN COMMITTEE FOR THE PREVENTION OF TORTURE AND INHUMAN OR DEGRADING
TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT, supra note 89, at ¶ 45.
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Table 4. Relationship between Custody Duration and Confession

In general, once the detainee was brought to the interview room, the Criminal
Investigation Department (CID) began the interrogation. Generally, two detectives at a time carried out the questioning. These detectives rotated with one or
more other teams, the usual practice being that between four and six officers
questioned the detainee. Undoubtedly, having a very large number of detectives
conduct a particular interrogation may create confusion in the detainee, and therefore increase the risk of a false confession. Recognizing the need to keep a check
on their numbers, the government commissioned the Bennett Report (following
multiple allegations of ill-treatment), which recommended inter alia that no more
than six police personnel be involved in any one case.92 Nevertheless, the problem persisted: our survey disclosed that this maximum was exceeded in 12 percent of cases in the 1988/9 data set.93 But the broader point is to illustrate the
dynamic of juridification in the interrogation space. The data then reveal that notwithstanding high-level recommendations to control and contain the nature of the

92. H.G. BENNETT, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO POLICE INTERROGATION
PROCEDURES IN NORTHERN IRELAND, 1979, Cmnd. 7497, ¶ 181 (UK). In addition, the Report was
instrumental in introducing changes (record-keeping, checks by superior officers, and medical and legal
access) which had some significant impact on the approach to interrogation and treatment, especially
after a legal basis was set out in the Northern Ireland (Emergency Powers) Act. See Northern Ireland
(Emergency Powers) Act of 1987, c. 30, §§ 14-16 (repealed 1991) (UK).
93. Data on file with authors.
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interface between the detainee and the police, the impact of the policy recommendations varied.
What is striking about this data is the obvious point that the majority of defendants give confessional evidence to their interrogators within 48 hours after being
brought into custody. As the narrative above indicates, the conditions under
which individuals were held and the oppressiveness of the interrogation environment may have been a significant contributing factor to their willingness to give
oral and/or written testimony. As will be discussed further below, this data set
undermines expansive claims by the state for the imperative of prolonged detention in order to extract sufficient evidence to charge and continue detention (on
the assumption that the goal is to process such individuals through the courts).
a. The Divergent Goals of Interrogation
The updated U.S. Field Manual on Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies
(COIN) the Manual reflects a virtual global unanimity in its depiction of accurate
and up-to-date intelligence as a key resource for the state facing terrorist challenges.94 Intelligence is the foundation of counter-insurgency action by the state.
The COIN strategy outlined in the Manual draws on a variety of cross-jurisdictional examples to highlight the consistency of this insight.
At the outbreak of the Northern Ireland conflict, the authorities’ intelligence
was famously poor, producing heavy reliance on prisoner interrogation.95 In the
short-term this deficit was tackled as a variety of intelligence agencies all operating in the jurisdiction built up informer networks,96 constructed vast databases recording details of homes and family life in insurgent-dominated areas, and later
developed ever more effective aerial and electronic surveillance techniques.
If the need for intelligence is a counter-insurgency truism, another is that interrogation purposes have bifurcated, producing partly incompatible goals: the
discovery of data (typically the function of intelligence operatives), and the generation of confessions usable as evidence at trial (typically a police function). The
latter entails examination of interrogation’s results by the courts, perhaps retrospectively imposing the juridic upon the interrogation room; the former may dictate that interrogation be conducted according to a simple test of effectiveness,
perhaps involving significant unlawfulness (including torture). In the authoritarian state, this bifurcation may make little difference as the courts may be willing
to overlook legal shortcomings in the evidence, but in the rechtsstaat,97 there are
likely to be limits to courts’ willingness to convict on confessions obtained
94. HEADQUARTERS, DEP’T OF THE ARMY & HEADQUARTERS, U.S. MARINE CORPS, FIELD MANUAL
3–24 (MARINE CORPS WARFIGHTING PUBLICATION 3-33.5), INSURGENCIES AND COUNTERINSURGENCIES,
at 1–19, 1–20 (May 2014), https://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-24.pdf.
95. Cf. FRANK KITSON, LOW INTENSITY OPERATIONS: SUBVERSION, INSURGENCY AND PEACEKEEPING
142–43 (1971).
96. See Ron Dudai, Informers and the Transition in Northern Ireland, 52 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 32,
35 (2012).
97. Jacqueline Ross, Do Rules of Evidence Apply (Only) in the Courtroom? Deceptive Interrogation
in the United States and Germany, 28 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 443, 467 & n.127 (2008).
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through abrasive interrogation. This bifurcation also manifested itself for a considerable period in Northern Ireland, with separate administrative guidelines
drawn up in 1977 (Guide to the Emergency Powers) on interrogation for intelligence-gathering as distinct from assembling legally-admissible evidence.98 It
ended formally in 1991 as the conflict was also heading into its end-game phase.
In the Courts, the rules on the admissibility of evidence were weakened, thereby
making confessional evidence the mainstay of many Diplock court trials with all
the attendant challenges of legitimacy and fairness.99
The dilemmas in this sphere are likely to be particularly acute where the state
initially embarks on a strategy of interrogation for intelligence-gathering, and
later institutes trials on the basis of admissions obtained under interrogation. In
the common law world, the only option is likely to be the alteration or abandonment of rules on admissibility of confessions. In the U.S. experience, the first
generation of military commissions can be seen partly as an attempt to create
quasi-judicial entities producing convictions using material from intelligenceoriented interrogation.100 This strategy, aiming at reliance upon unlawfully obtained
confessions and therefore at the exclusion of the juridic, proved non-viable over
time, as before the most recent generation of Military Commissions such confessions became inadmissible.101 In parallel, bifurcation in the United Kingdom ended
with the Terrorism Act 2000 (Cessation of Effect of Section 76) Order, 2002, affirming again a non-linear move from exception to a form of regularization, in the envelope of permanent anti-terrorism legislation.102 Clearly the juridic trumps, but in a
form of norm-exception hybrid that resists easy classification.

98. The Guidance was replaced by a code under section 61 of the 1991 EPA. Northern Ireland
(Emergency Provisions) Act 1991, c. 24, § 61 (UK). With respect to the Northern Ireland Office’s Guide
to the Emergency Powers, police are reminded of the necessity to caution before questioning only when
the detainee is suspected of an offense and when questions are put for the purpose of obtaining evidence
to be put in court. The inference may be correctly drawn that not all persons are detained in connection
with offenses nor questioned about them. CLIVE WALKER, THE PREVENTION OF TERRORISM IN BRITISH
LAW 195 (2d ed. 1992). The use of the Guidance is also discussed in MARK URBAN, BIG BOYS’ RULES:
THE SAS AND THE SECRET STRUGGLE AGAINST THE IRA (1992). The parallels to this challenge in the
United States are aptly illustrated by the Guanta´namo Military Commissions. Detainees initially held
and interrogated using torture with the stated goal of eliciting information to prevent further attacks on
the United States, were later processed for trial by military commission, creating the insurmountable
obstacle of ‘clean’ evidence. See Christopher W. Behan, Everybody Talks: Evaluating the Admissibility
of Coercively Obtained Evidence in Trials by Military Commission, 48 WASHBURN L.J. 563, 592 (2009);
Carol Rosenberg, How Long After Torture are Statements Admissible? Guanta´namo Court Debates
Question, MIAMI HERALD (Aug. 4, 2017), http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/
americas/Guantánamo/article165305107.html; Morris D. Davis, Historical Perspective on Guanta´namo
Bay: The Arrival of the High Value Detainees, 42 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 115, 120 (2009).
99. On the rules of admissibility in Diplock Courts, see John D. Jackson & Sean Doran, Conventional
Trials in Unconventional Times: The Diplock Court Experience, 4 CRIM. L.F. 503, 506–08 (1993).
100. See Muneer I. Ahmad, Resisting Guantánamo: Rights at the Brink of Dehumanization, 103 NW.
U.L. REV. 1683, 1721–22 (2009).
101. David Cole, Military Commissions and the Paradigm of Prevention, in GUANTANAMO AND
BEYOND: EXCEPTIONAL COURTS AND MILITARY COMMISSIONS IN COMPARATIVE AND POLICY
PERSPECTIVE (Oren Gross & Fionnuala Nı´ Aoláin, eds. 2013).
102. The Terrorism Act 2000 (Cessation of Effect of Section 76) Order 2002, SI 2002/2141 (UK).
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V. ACCESS TO LAWYERS
Globally, the question of access by independent lawyers to clients held in interrogation centers is a fraught issue. Contact with the outside world, particularly
within the first forty-eight hours of detention, is recognized as one of the best
brakes on detainee ill-treatment.103 A prisoner may find herself having to deal
with a mass of unfamiliar legal requirements in a highly charged environment.
From the state’s perspective, access to independent lawyers may be seen to break
interrogation’s rhythm, limiting its effectiveness. Where the interrogation is conducted by, or at the behest of, the secret state, unlawfulness may be common, providing independent lawyers with opportunities ripe for legal exposure in a way
that conflicts with the secret state’s agenda and effectiveness. Similarly, there
may be resistance to lawyers’ presence during interrogation, not simply because
this would hamper interrogators’ style, but also because the state will argue that
sensitive information with which the detainee should be confronted cannot be disclosed in the lawyer’s presence. Finally, the state may conflate the lawyer’s professional duty to her client’s case with unprofessional sympathy with the client’s
cause, perhaps presuming that “they will pass information to terrorists” and/or
“they are terrorists.”104 Even if the state (particularly the secret state), succeeds at
first instance in whole or in part to exclude lawyers from interrogation centers, in
the rechtstaat, multiple challenges by lawyers are likely in the superior courts.105
Lawyer participation therefore becomes a site of conflict where the battle for its
juridification consistently plays out.
U.S. authorities have, at various points, attempted to strictly limit access to civilian counsel for those Guanta´namo prisoners without pending habeas petitions
(although at least one federal court has rejected these restrictions).106 During

103. See G.A. Res. 39/46, annex, Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, art. 6, ¶ 3 (Dec. 10, 1984).
104. Threats against lawyers were pervasive in Northern Ireland. See SIR MICHAEL MORLAND, DAME
VALERIE STRACHAN, AND SIR ANTHONY BURDEN, THE ROSEMARY NELSON INQUIRY REPORT, 2011, HC
947, (UK); Fred Attewill, RUC Ignored Death Threats Against Murdered Lawyer, THE GUARDIAN (Sep.
19, 2007), https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2007/sep/19/northernireland; Owen Bowcott, Pat Finucane
Case: The Secret Service Failures and Black Ops That Led to Killing, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 12, 2012),
https:www.theguardian.com/uk/2012/dec/12/pat-finucane-secret-service-killing; Mark McGovern, State
Violence and the Colonial Roots of Collusion in Northern Ireland, 57 RACE & CLASS, no. 2, 2015, at 3;
HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, A TROUBLING TURN: THE VILIFICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAWYERS IN
NORTHERN IRELAND (2017), http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/sites/default/files/A-Troubling-Turn.pdf.
105. See, e.g., Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004);
Averill v. United Kingdom, 2000-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 203; Brannigan and McBride v. United Kingdom,
258 Eur. Ct. H.R. 29 (ser. A) (1993); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Checks and balances in Wartime:
American, British and Israeli Experiences, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1906 (2004).
106. In re Guantánamo Bay Detainee Continued Access to Counsel, No. 12-398, 2012 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 126833, at *74 (D.D.C. Sept. 6, 2012); see also Amy Shepard, Note, Hinging on Habeas? The
Guantánamo Memorandum of Understanding and the Detainees’ Continued Right to Counsel, 1 NAT’L
SEC. L.J. 151 (2013) (evaluating the Memorandum of Understanding restrictions struck down in In re
Guantánamo Bay Detainee Continued Access to Counsel); Fionnuala Nı´ Aoláin, Lawyers, Military
Commissions and the Rule of Law in Democratic States, in COUNTER-TERRORISM, CONSTITUTIONALISM
AND MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE (Colin King, Genevieve Lennon and Carole Mccartney, eds. 2018).
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interrogation, prisoners had been denied access to lawyers of any kind, at least
from 2002 to 2004.107 The protection of the attorney-client privilege remains an
ongoing issue at the Guantánamo Military Commissions. In pre-trial proceedings,
the docket has consistently dealt with defense motions to permanently and verifiably disable audio monitoring equipment capability in attorney-client meeting
rooms,108 as well as the effect on the attorney client relationships of an FBI investigation regarding one defense team and the infiltration of that same defense team
by the FBI.109 In earlier versions, the Administration also sought in specific cases
to limit and control the independence of counsel defending persons suspected of
terrorist offenses. For example, in the case of Richard Reid, the U.K. national
who tried to ignite explosives contained in his shoes on an American Airlines
flight, Reid’s lawyers from the Federal Public Defender’s office refused to sign a
document, based on the Special Administrative Measures, that effectively restricted their ability and independence to conduct their client’s defense.110
Punitive measures followed, including the administration’s decision to cut off
access to their client.111 In January 2007, a senior U.S. official condemned U.S.
law firms for representing inmates of the Guanta´namo internment camp, explicitly stating that it was “shocking” that they were “representing detainees down
there” and suggesting that when corporate America was aware of their practices
“those CEO’s are going to make those law firms choose between representing terrorists or representing reputable firms.”112 A speedy Pentagon retraction followed
these remarks,113 affirming a thread we analyze further here, namely the
107. See LAUREL FLETCHER ET AL., HUM. RTS. CTR. AND INT’L HUM. RTS. L. CLINIC, U.C.,
BERKELEY, GUANTÁNAMO AND ITS AFTERMATH: U.S. DETENTION AND INTERROGATION PRACTICES AND
THEIR IMPACT ON FORMER DETAINEES 77 (2008).
108. See Appellate Exhibit 133RR, Mr. al Baluchi’s Motion To Permanently and Verifiably Disable
Audio Monitoring Capability in Attorney-Client Meeting Rooms, United States v. Mohammad (Military
Comm’ns Trial Judiciary July 17, 2017), http://www.mc.mil/Portals/0/pdfs/KSM2/KSM%20II%20
(AE133RR(AAA)).PDF.
109. Nı́ Aoláin, Lawyers, Military Commissions and the Rule of Law in Democratic States supra note
106; David Luban, Lawfare and Legal Ethics in Guantanamo, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1981 (2008).
110. United States v. Reid, 214 F. Supp. 2d 84, 87-88 (D. Mass. 2002); see also Douglass Cassell,
Pretrial and Preventive Detention of Suspected Terrorists: Options and Constraints Under International
Law, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 811 (2008) (discussing the use of preventative detention in Reid
and other cases).
111. See Reid, 214 F. Supp. 2d at 88. Special Administrative Measures (SAM’s) were regulations
promulgated by Attorney General Ashcroft which allowed the imposition upon Federal Prisoners
restrictions inter alia on communication. Id. at 86. All SAMs are prisoner specific. Id. at 87. The
government eventually stood back from the measures and the limitations prevented what would have
been a likely constitutional clash over the meaning and application of the Sixth Amendment. See id. at
100.
112. Charles “Cully” Stimson, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for detainee affairs, sought
to discourage American corporations from doing business with law firms that represented inmates of the
Guantánamo internment camp. Neil A. Lewis, Official Attacks Top Law Firms Over Detainees, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 13, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/13/washington/13gitmo.html; Editorial,
Editorial, Round Up the Usual Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 13, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/
13/opinion/13sat1.html.
113. Josh White, U.S. Official Apologizes for Guanta´namo Remarks, WASH. POST (Jan. 17, 2007),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/01/16/AR2007011601442.html.
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continued (if limited) traction that accords to the right to counsel even when other
related and fundamental rights in a due process context are being largely stripped
of meaningful content.
Clearly if restricting the pool of defense lawyers at Guanta´namo was aimed
at producing a cohort of docile advocates, the strategy failed. Links established
by military lawyers with their civilian counterparts facilitated strategic claimsmaking in the civil courts, ultimately undermining three generations of Military
Commissions.114 Moreover, the robust defense of detainees undertaken by military defense lawyers presents an interesting sub-case of the dampening effect of
legal counsel on the operation and effectiveness of the closed state.115
As the conflict reignited in Northern Ireland (from 1969 onwards), persons
held under emergency powers initially had no explicit right of access to a lawyer
during detention. Eventually, a conditional right was granted in 1987.116 While a
proposal to limit access to a pool of selected counsel surfaced at one time,117 the
scheme came to nothing. Defense counsel faced challenges of access but rarely
complete denial of legal representation. Faced with the numbers of CID officers
114. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006);
Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004); In re Khalid Shaikh Mohammad, 866 F.3d 473 (D.C. Cir.
2017) (per curiam); In re Khadr, 823 F.3d 92, 97 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2016); In re al-Nashiri 791 F.3d 71, 75–
76 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
115. See Laura A. Dickinson, Military Lawyers on the Battlefield: An Empirical Account of
International Law Compliance, 104 AM. J. INT’L L. 1 (2010) (analyzing the role of military lawyers in
curbing transgressions and affecting legal culture in the zone of conflict).
116. Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1987, c. 30, § 15 (UK).
117. The issue arose when the Independent Commissioner for the Holding Centres, Sir Louis BlomCooper, came to consider the UN Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers, principle 8 of which
provided: “All arrested, detained or imprisoned persons shall be provided with adequate opportunities,
time and facilities to be visited by and to communicate with and consult with a lawyer without delay,
interception or censorship and in full confidentiality. Such consultations may be within sight, but not
within hearing, of law enforcement officials.” FIRST ANNUAL BLOM-COOPER REPORT, supra note 83, at
65 (quoting Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of
Offenders, Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers, art. 8 (Aug. 27-Sept. 7, 1990)). Provisions, such as
those in the 1987 EPA allowing police officers to listen in on consultations would appear to have been
ruled out by principle 8. Compare 1987 EPA, supra note 110, at § 15, ¶ 11, with Basic Principles, art. 8.
In addition, denial of access to solicitors as permitted in Northern Ireland would appear to conflict with
principles 1, 5 and 8. Blom-Cooper in his first report took a different view. Drawing a distinction
between legal advice which is required prior to charging, and legal assistance which is called for once a
suspect has been charged, his opinion was that the UN principles “relate exclusively to criminal
proceedings. A person arrested on suspicion of having committed a crime, but who has not yet been
charged with any offence, becomes subject to the rules of criminal justice only on being charged.” FIRST
ANNUAL BLOM-COOPER REPORT, supra note 83, at 66. The UN principles were therefore inapplicable to
the situation in the interrogation centers prior to charging. Id. Elsewhere he opined: “It is this legal
advice to which the suspect is entitled to have access. It is, moreover, an entitlement to a service and not
to an individual professional who is qualified to provide advice.” Id. at 68. For that reason, he felt free to
draw up a scheme whereby in place of the existing deferrable right to have access to a solicitor of his/her
choice, the detainee would have access to a lawyer employed by a legal advice unit administered by the
Law Society for Northern Ireland, and attached to the holding centre. Id. at 68–71. Other lawyers, in his
view, “should be debarred from any professional involvement at the Holding Centre.” Id. at 70. See also
B. Fitzpatrick and Clive Walker, Holding Centres in Northern Ireland, the Independent Commissioner
and the Rights of Detainees, 4 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 27, 38 (1999) (explaining that Blom-Cooper’s
promotion of the Legal Advice Unit failed).
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described above, detainees were at a distinct legal disadvantage. The officers
would have been familiar with the possibly damning legal consequences that
might flow from the use of particular words or phrases by the suspect, while she
was almost invariably not. This was particularly so in the context of the limitations on the “right to silence,” the common-law incarnation of the right against
self-incrimination, introduced in Northern Ireland in 1988.118 The problems were
compounded by the nebulousness of the grounds for arrest under the Prevention
of Terrorism Act (suspicion of involvement in terrorism), which might result in
the detainee not being told of which (if any) specific offense she was suspected.
And in the case of an incommunicado arrest where family and friends were not
informed, this general insecurity would have been exacerbated by an acute sense
of isolation for the detainee.
PTA detainees were therefore particularly in need of access to their lawyers –
indeed in England and Wales during the same period it was the norm not only to
allow such consultation when requested, but also to permit counsel to sit in on her
client’s interrogation. In Northern Ireland, the position was quite different. The
1991 Emergency Provisions Act provided that the right of access by a person
held under the “terrorism provisions”119 could be delayed for up to 48 hours at a
time, where a police superintendent had reasonable grounds to believe the exercise of the right might lead to such consequences as the harming of evidence or
the alerting of suspects not yet arrested.120
These powers are based upon, but are more draconian than, provisions of
PACE which have also been followed in PACE (NI) 1989.121 Despite the fact that
the uniform branch of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) are regarded as having overall responsibility for the detainee’s welfare, the decision on access to
legal advisors was invariably made by an officer from the detective branch, those
engaged specifically in direct counter-terrorism management.
In line with experience elsewhere around the globe, it is possible that denial of
access to counsel was motivated less by suspicion that information would be
passed to paramilitary groups than by fear that access would interfere with interrogation. Accordingly, a number of motions attempted to challenge and force

118. See generally SUSAN EASTON, THE CASE FOR THE RIGHT TO SILENCE (2d ed. 1998); Andrew
Ashworth & Peter Creighton, The Right of Silence in Northern Ireland, in LESSONS FROM NORTHERN
IRELAND 117 (Jon Hayes & Paul O’Higgins eds., 1990).
119. Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1991, c. 24, § 45(1) (UK).
120. Section 45(8) of the 1991 EPA, id., provided for delays where a senior officer believes access
“(a) will lead to interference with or harm to evidence connected with a scheduled offence or
interference with or physical injury to any person; or (b) will lead to the alerting of any person suspected
of having committed such an offence but not yet arrested for it; or (c) will hinder the recovery of any
property obtained as a result of such an offence; or (d) will lead to interference with the gathering of
information about the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism; or (e) by alerting any
person, will make it more difficult—(i) to prevent an act of terrorism; or (ii) to secure the apprehension,
prosecution or conviction of any person in connection with the commission, preparation or instigation of
an act of terrorism.” Id. at § 45(8).
121. The Police and Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1989, SI 1989/1341 (N. Ir. 12)
art. 59.
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some reasonable explanation for the delay, thus confirming that the matter could
be susceptible to meaningful scrutiny by the courts.122
Following a series of high court decisions concerning access to legal counsel
there was a marked fall-off in denial of access to legal counsel in the 1990s in
Northern Ireland, suggesting that repeated challenges may have had an ameliorating effect on police conduct.123 This represents an important point of juridification
and a tipping from de facto deference to intelligence towards prioritization to due
process constraints. Also significant was an emerging practice of courts in the
122. In Re McNearney, the Belfast High Court held that the police (RUC) had to offer specific
reasons for the denial of access to legal counsel, and that general claims would not suffice. See, Re
McNearney [1991] High Court (NI). In Re Duffy, the solicitor whose access had been denied sought to
challenge his exclusion by reliance on an undertaking which he had provided to the RUC, “Not to
communicate with any person, any matter as to what occurred during consultation for the deferred
period” and “[t]o maintain total supervision over any papers relating to this consultation.” In this
instance access was granted since the High Court accepted the argument that “there is now no risk of a
message containing a coded warning to terrorists being conveyed, because the solicitor has given an
undertaking, the sincerity of which has not been challenged, that he will not pass on any message to
anyone.” This was not however, a blanket validation of such undertakings, since the court was at pains
to state that it recognized that there was a possibility that in a particular case, an undertaking “could not
be relied upon.” The giving of such undertakings therefore presents a number of problems for lawyers.
Were the police to assert, as it was suggested in Re Duffy they might, that a particular solicitor’s
undertaking was unreliable, this would have the effect of marking out the solicitor in question as a
‘terrorist sympathizer’ with all the consequences which could flow from such a categorization. If the
grounds on which the RUC’s opinion of a particular solicitor were to be challenged, the police would
almost certainly claim that this was a confidential intelligence matter, the sources for which could not be
disclosed. Re Duffy’s Application [1991] 7 N.I.J.B. 62 HC. Even were the court not to accept the RUC’s
assertion, the damage would have been done. Moreover, as the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights
pointed out, undertakings not to disclose information are in direct conflict with the solicitor’s obligation
to his/her client to use information gleaned from the initial interview to seek exculpatory evidence
without delay, or simply to relay pressing messages to the detainees’ family. LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND LEGAL DEFENSE IN NORTHERN IRELAND (1993). Subsequent
rulings have, in any case, tended to undermine the usefulness of these undertakings. Re McKenna and
McKenna involved an application for judicial review of denial of access where the solicitor in question
filed an undertaking in the usual terms. In response, the police asserted that where a solicitor had
submitted an undertaking in good faith, a paramilitary group would still force him/her to divulge
information through kidnapping and torture. This prompted the solicitor to submit an affidavit in which
he averred that “It has not been my personal experience nor has it been the experience of any member of
this firm that any pressure has been brought to bear by members of terrorist organizations to divulge
confidential information.” In the event, police investigations were completed before the matter came to
court, and access had been granted. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal took the opportunity to deal with
the substance of the matter holding that the police had satisfied the burden of proof that there were
reasonable grounds for the Superintendent’s belief “because the Provisional IRA is a completely
ruthless and unscrupulous terrorist organization which would be fully prepared to threat (sic), against
him or his family, to compel [the solicitor] against his will and in breach of his undertaking, to disclose
to it what the applicants had told him in the course of consultations.” Re McKenna and McKenna [1991]
Court of Appeal (NI, unreported). The ruling was buttressed by the decision of the Court of Appeal in Re
Kenneway, in which substantially the same police argument was accepted. While there has, in Britain,
been some willingness to accept the ‘coded message’ argument when considering the corresponding
provisions of PACE, the courts in general have taken a more robust attitude to police assertions than has
been evident in Northern Ireland and no ‘kidnapping’ argument has ever been accepted (or even
presented). In re Kenneway’s Application [1992] Court of Appeal (Northern Ireland) (unreported).
123. See, e.g., R v. McNeill [1993] NI 46, 48 CA; R v. Harper [1990] NI 28, 30 CA; R v. Dillon and
Another, [1984] NI 292, 292 CA.

2018]

MANAGING TERRORISM

397

jurisdiction to issue interim injunctions which prevented interrogation prior to the
hearing of the substantive issue. Thus, even where the application ultimately
failed, the interrogation process had been interrupted. The change may also have
come about from a realization that a strategy of over-reliance on far-fetched
excuses before judges for denial of access would prove untenable in the long
term.124 A further factor facilitating access may have been the willingness of the
courts to exclude confessions obtained when access to a lawyer has been manifestly unlawfully denied,125 though in other cases where admissibility of confessions has been challenged on the basis of denial of access, the Diplock courts
displayed a willingness to accept the kind of police arguments advanced in the judicial review cases.126
Developments in relation to access to legal advice in the 1990s were not, however, uniformly positive, as lawyers reported an innovative tactic of granting
access immediately following arrest, and then subsequently using the power to
defer access to allow questioning to continue.127 This had the advantage from the
police point of view of enabling the investigating officers to claim that the suspect
had immediate access to independent legal advice if the matter was raised (for
instance, where the admissibility of a confession is at issue). But, from the detainee’s point of view, this arrangement offered the distinct disadvantage that since
the consultation would generally take place before the interrogation started, she
would typically have no idea of the charges (if any) she would face, and thus the
effective legal advice the lawyer would provide was very limited. Where access
was granted, it is not at all clear that the confidentiality of the lawyer-client relationship was respected, even where there had been no stipulation that the consultation take place within the vision of a police officer.
At the start of this century, patterns from the 1990s concerning access to counsel
for terrorism related (PTA) detainees remained largely intact, although some shifts
were evident. Most striking in our survey data was the extent to which the picture
of PTA detentions provided the reverse image to those under PACE (NI). In 86
percent of PTA detentions, the prisoners’ lawyer was not present during interrogation (Table 5), the typical practice being that access was granted when the detainee
was first brought to Castlereagh, and then after forty-eight hours. In the case of
PACE (NI) detentions however, 87 percent of prisoners had their lawyers present
(Table 5). Reflecting a degree of softening in the police position, 8 percent of PTA
detainees were permitted to have their lawyers present during some or all of the
124. For example, to many seasoned observers of the legal system in Northern Ireland, the prospect
of solicitors or their families being kidnapped and mistreated by paramilitary groups seems less than
entirely convincing. No evidence was forthcoming that such events had taken place in the past, and were
such kidnappings to occur, it is unlikely that solicitors would continue with their current work practices.
The result therefore for paramilitary organizations whose members (or alleged members) were regularly
appearing before the Courts, would have been practically entirely counter-productive.
125. See R v. Gilgunn (Oct. 1991) (unreported).
126. See R v. Harper [1990] NI 28 CA.
127. See Martin S. Flaherty, Interrogation, Legal Advice, and Human Rights in Northern Ireland, 27
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 7–8 (1995).
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Table 5. Detention Power & Presence of a Lawyer
Lawyer Presence & Interrogation
L. Present All

L. Present Some

Lawyer Not

Interrogations

Interrogations

Present

Row %

Row %

Arrest Power

Not Known

Row %

Total

Row %

Col %

S.14 PTA
1989

3

4%

3

4%

69

86%

5

6%

80

63%

S.18 EPA
1996

0

0%

0

0%

0

0%

0

0%

0

0%

33

87%

1

3%

4

11%

0

0%

38

30%

Other

5

63%

0

0%

3

38%

0

0%

8

6%

Not known

1

100%

0

0%

0

0%

0

0%

1

1%

42

33%

4

3%

76

60%

5

4%

127

100%

Art 26 PACE
(NI) 1989

Total

interrogation. These prisoners benefited from a regime that had already been in
place in England, and would be introduced in Northern Ireland a few years later.
The issue of access to counsel also illustrates the salience of the Diplock system’s
hybridity at the start of the twentieth century. Two quite distinct feeder mechanisms
are identifiable: the PTA route and that of PACE (NI). This multiplicity of routes to
access counsel carried through to trial, where the insertion of a PACE stream into
the Diplock system seemed to present few institutional difficulties (the issue of confessions is discussed below). This finding underscores our broader hypothesis that
there is fluidity both ways: exception-norm and norm-exception. This both provides
further support for the juridification hypothesis, but also implicitly articulates some
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ambivalences: the fact that towards the end of the conflict the ordinary law on detention could be knitted seamlessly with Diplock trials meant that the system approximated more to the legal norm; but this may only have been possible at least partly
because the legal norm, (represented by PACE (NI)), was heavily shaped by the
exception (represented by the PTA). Overall, however, access to lawyers has
improved as evidenced by a marked increase in access to lawyers under PACE conditions,128 approximated to the exception (represented by PTA).
VI. CONFESSIONAL EVIDENCE AND THE CLOSED STATE
Walsh’s 1984 study found that 90 percent of Diplock cases were based solely
or mainly on confessions.129 The figure is striking, particularly when seen against
the background of abusive interrogation in Northern Ireland in the 1970s.130 The
key to understanding the role played by confessions in the Diplock system lies in
the special rules for the admissibility of confessions before Diplock courts introduced by the Emergency Provisions Act.131 At the start of the conflict the ordinary law demanded that confessions be voluntary in order to be admissible.
Predictably, confessions obtained in interrogation-oriented facilities were ruled
inadmissible by the ordinary courts. In order to preserve this interrogationoriented approach, the voluntariness test was abolished for the Diplock courts.132
In its place came a test that made statements inadmissible if obtained by inhuman
or degrading treatment or torture.133 This begged the question of the degree of
coercion short of inhuman or degrading treatment (the European Convention on
128. DAVID BROWN, HOME OFFICE, PACE 10 YEARS ON: A REVIEW OF THE RESEARCH 91–121
(Home Office Research Study 155, 1997) (UK); TOM BUCKE & DAVID BROWN, HOME OFFICE, IN
POLICE CUSTODY: POLICE POWERS AND SUSPECTS’ RIGHTS UNDER THE REVISED PACE CODES OF
PRACTICE 19–29 (Home Office Research Study 174, 1997) (UK). Northern Ireland Office statistics for
terrorism arrests after the passage of the Terrorism Act show limited refusals / delays in access. See, e.g.,
NORTHERN IRELAND STATISTICS AND RESEARCH AGENCY, NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE, RESEARCH AND
STATISTICAL BULLETIN 2/2002, NORTHERN IRELAND STATISTICS ON THE OPERATION OF THE TERRORISM
ACT 2000: JULY-SEPTEMBER 2001, at 17, http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20040722012500/
http://www.nio.gov.uk/azlist.htm.
129. WALSH, supra note 20, at 84.
130. See Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1978) (the judgments and decisions in
the case); Ireland v. United Kingdom, 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. B) (multiple years) (the pleadings, European
Commission on Human Rights’ report to the European Court of Human Rights, and other documents);
Samantha Newbery, Intelligence and Controversial British Interrogation Techniques: The Northern
Ireland Case 1971–2, 20 IRISH STUD. INT’L AFF. 103, 103–04 (2009).
131. The Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions Act) 1973, c. 53, § 6 (UK).
132. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION TO CONSIDER LEGAL PROCEDURES TO DEAL WITH TERRORIST
ACTIVITIES IN NORTHERN IRELAND, 1972, Cmnd. 5185, para. 80 (UK) (noting that the legal requirement
of voluntary admission would exclude all statements uncovered through interrogation).
133. The first revised test was set out in the 1973 EPA, supra note 124. Over time, this changed
slightly, so that section 11 of the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1991 provided:
(2) Where . . . —
(a) the prosecution proposes to give, or (as the case may be) has given, in evidence a statement
made by the accused, and
(b) prima facie evidence is adduced that the accused was subjected to torture, to inhuman or
degrading treatment, or to any violence or threat of violence (whether or not amounting to
torture), in order to induce him to make the statement, then, unless the prosecution satisfies the
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Human Rights standard) that might be permissible. While at least one judge
seemed willing to tolerate “a moderate degree of physical ill-treatment,”134 this
approach was not acceptable to the superior courts. The message that interrogators appear to have received is that confessions did not need to be voluntary, but
could not be relied on if the detainee bore marks of physical ill treatment. This
provided the legislative backdrop to the plethora of ill-treatment allegations in
the late 1970s. Over the years, the test for admissibility was tightened somewhat
by statute and through case law, but it remained distinct from the ordinary law. If
reliance on the confession declined overall, it still retained obvious attractions for
the intelligence operatives who conducted the interrogations. First, it had the virtues of simplicity: a conviction could be obtained on no evidence other than a
statement provided by the defendant. Second, where a defendant made a confession, there was no need to go behind the statement in a way that might disclose
why the interrogators had begun questioning her about that particular crime. The
result could be to protect informers and/or electronic surveillance strategies.
Our data tracked the decline of confessions in the Diplock system, with a significant downward shift in 1988/89, culminating in a situation in 2001–02 in which
confessions were present in only 25 percent of cases (Table 7). What empirical
evidence at the latter stages of the conflict in Northern Ireland illustrates is that
safeguards designed to guard against abusive interrogation practices, and heightened scrutiny by the U.N. and European Committees Against Torture,135 seem to
have had a practical impact in the custodial space. Certainly, at least, claims of illtreatment greatly decreased. One contributory factor that may explain this shift is
that the state became increasingly reliant upon (and more expert in gathering)
“hard” evidence: this evidence would typically include scene-of-the-crime

court that the statement was not obtained by so subjecting the accused in the manner indicated by that
evidence, the court shall do one of the following things, namely—
(i) in the case of a statement proposed to be given in evidence, exclude the statement;
(ii) in the case of a statement already received in evidence, continue the trial disregarding the
statement; or
(iii) in either case, direct that the trial shall be restarted before a differently constituted court
(before which the statement in question shall be inadmissible).
(3) It is hereby declared that, in the case of any statement made by the accused and not obtained by so
subjecting him as mentioned in subsection (2)(b) above, the court in any such proceedings as are
mentioned in subsection (1) above has a discretion to do one of the things mentioned in subsection (2)(i)
to (iii) above if it appears to the court that it is appropriate to do so in order to avoid unfairness to the
accused or otherwise in the interests of justice. Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1991, c.
24, § 11 (UK).
134. R. v. McCormick [1977] NI 105, 111 (Belfast) .
135. See, e.g., Commission for the Prevention of Torture, Conditions of Detention in Police
Establishments: United Kingdom (Northern Ireland) Visit Report 1993, COUNCIL OF EUROPE (Mar. 13,
1994), http://hudoc.cpt.coe.int/eng?i=p-gbr-19930720-en-12; Commission for the Prevention of
Torture, Recapitulations and Conclusions/ A. Castlereagh Holding Centres, COUNCIL OF EUROPE (July
21, 2000), http://hudoc.cpt.coe.int/eng?i=p-gbr-19991129-en-35; Committee Against Torture, Fourth
Periodic Report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/67/
Add. 2 (May. 27, 2004).
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forensics and fiber evidence (which figured significantly in our survey).136
One further dimension that may explain the data’s demonstration of a decrease
in confession-based evidence is a shift due to the abrogation of the right against
self-incrimination – the “right to silence,” discussed above. The dynamics of this
shift are the subject of a separate analysis in our larger research project, and that
analysis will not be replicated here. What can be noted is that the Criminal
Evidence (NI) Order 1988 permits inferences, which may be negative, from a
detainee’s failure to mention a fact that she later relies upon in defense, or where
she fails to account for marks on her clothes, or for her presence in a particular
place.137 A detainee may have perfectly understandable reasons for staying silent,
and yet run the risk of negative inferences.138 In any case, the Order may place
the interrogator in a win-win situation. If the detainee speaks, she may incriminate herself, but if she stays silent in response to specific questions, she may also
incriminate herself. Our survey highlighted universal use of a new general caution139 (“post-Miranda” in U.S. terms), and significant levels of use of the
136. This instinct seemed to have been shared by non-state actors also evidenced by the bombing of
the building which housed and processed such evidence in the 1990s. See David McKittrick, Damage in
Huge Blast Put at 20m Pounds: A Belfast Housing Estate Counts the Cost of an IRA Bomb Which May
Have Destroyed Vital Criminal Evidence, THE INDEPENDENT (Sep. 24, 1992), http://www.independent.
co.uk/news/uk/damage-in-huge-blast-put-at-20m-pounds-a-belfast-housing-estate-counts-the-cost-of-anira-bomb-which-1553481.html.
137. The Order enables a judge, jury or magistrate to draw ‘such inferences . . .’ as appear proper
from an accused’s silence in four main circumstances:
* (Art. 3) where during police questioning s/he fails to mention a fact relied on in her defence in
subsequent proceedings;
* (Art. 4). where at his trial s/he fails to give evidence or to answer questions (without cause) when
requested by the court;
* (Art. 5) where following arrest, s/he fails when requested to account for the presence of any
object, substance or mark on her person, clothing or in her possession or in any place in which
s/he is at the time of her arrest;
* (Art. 6) where following arrest, s/he fails to account for her presence at a place at the time the
offence for which s/he was arrested is alleged to have been committed.
Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1988, SI 1988/1987 (N.I. 20) (as amended). Silence in
these circumstances can be taken to amount to corroboration of other evidence against the accused, see
id., but a person cannot be convicted solely on the basis of an inference from her silence. Id. at Art. 2(4).
Inferences under the Order can be drawn at committal stage, when deciding whether the accused has a
case to answer at the end of the prosecution case, and when reaching a finding of guilt or innocence. Id.
at Art. 3(2).
138. In the case of someone detained under the PTA, since the police do not need to explain the
precise offenses suspected, the person may be afraid to break her silence, because to do so may risk
suggesting involvement in some as yet unknown crimes. The person may also be afraid that to speak will
implicate others, and thus attract the ‘informer’ label, with possible lethal consequences at the hands of
paramilitary groups. Uncertainty about their legal position my also lead them to refuse to answer
questions until they have had the opportunity to speak to their solicitor, an event which, as discussed
above, can be deferred for 48 hours at a time.
139. In response to the introduction of the Order, a new general caution was introduced by the RUC
in the following terms (1988):
You do not have to say anything unless you wish to do so but I must warn you that if you fail to mention any fact which you rely on in your defence in court, your failure to take this opportunity to mention it may be treated in court as supporting any relevant evidence against you. If you do wish to say
anything, what you say may be given in evidence.
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provisions of the Order in relation to such issues as requiring explanations for the
presence of fibers or for the defendant’s location at particular times.
The Order was introduced in Northern Ireland by an expedited “Order in
Council” procedure as part of an “anti-terrorist package” following one of the
region’s periodic upsurges in violence.140 Shortly thereafter, with some pockets
of dissent,141 virtually identical provisions were legislated for in Britain.142 The
result was that provisions initially having the aura of exceptionality soon became
entrenched and normalized, reinforcing the point that the exception changed the
norm in its own image, and the scope of normal criminal justice norms was irrevocably changed.
Defense lawyers play a critical part in the legitimization process that is everpresent in exceptional court regimes. The right to defend oneself or to be
defended by legal assistance of one’s own choosing is deeply entrenched in the
normative framework of many constitutions and also in international human
rights’ law treaties.143 In multiple contexts the state places specific constraints on
the access to and independence of defense counsel.144 Paradoxically, lawyers
occupy a singular space by simultaneously providing the means to undermine the
courts they operate within and legitimate them by the fact of their representation.
Maintaining the convention of independent representation remains a defining

Additional forms of caution are employed where the RUC wish to invoke the provisions of art. 5 and art.
6 of the Order. Cited in Averill v. United Kingdom No 36408/97 ECtHR (Third Section), decision of
06.07. 1999.
140. One of the worst atrocities of the conflict was the Omagh Bombing, which swiftly led to further
legal responses by the state. See Omagh Bomb: 15 August 1998, BBC (last viewed on Sep. 4, 2017),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/events/omagh_bomb. The legislation which followed was the Criminal
Justice (Terrorism and Conspiracy) Act 1998, c. 40 (UK). See Clive Walker, The Bombs in Omagh and
their Aftermath: The Criminal Justice (Terrorism and Conspiracy Act) 1998, 62 MOD. L. REV. 879
(1999).
141. See ROYAL COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, REPORT, 1993, Cm. 2263, at 55 (UK) (“They
may still choose to run the risk of such comment, or indeed to remain silent throughout their trial. But if
they do, it will be in the knowledge that their hope of an acquittal rests on the ability of defending
counsel either to convince the jury that there is a reasonable explanation for the departure or, where
silence is maintained throughout, to discredit the prosecution evidence in the jury’s eyes”).
142. See, e.g., Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, c. 33, §§ 34–38 (UK).
143. E.g. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 14(3)(d), Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.
T.S. 171 (“Everyone charged with a criminal offense shall have the right . . . to be charged in his
presence, and to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing . . .”).
144. See FIRST ANNUAL BLOM-COOPER REPORT, supra note 83, at 68–76 (recommending
establishment of a “legal advice unit” to advise persons detained at Holding Centres and indicating that
in most instances such unit would take the place of private solicitors). A cogent U.S. example is the
decision of a federal judge in Manhattan to reject a request for a lawyer for Nazih Abdul-Hamed alRuqai, who faced indictment on conspiracy charges stemming from the 1998 bombing of two United
States embassies in East Africa. See, e.g., Benjamin Weiser, Request to Appoint Lawyer for Terror
Suspect is Denied, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 11, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/12/nyregion/requestto-appoint-lawyer-for-terror-suspect-is-denied.html. Acknowledging the importance of transparency
and participation by external counsel in Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) proceedings,
modifications to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) in 2015 permit appointment of amicus
curiae to address concerns about legitimacy and independence at the FISC. See USA Freedom Act of
2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, § 401, 129 Stat. 267, 279-80.
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aspect of Special Courts and Military Commissions in most contexts.145 States
seem generally willing to carry the costs of the internal and external critiques
posed by such lawyers, including the ongoing possibility that strong representation
may assist persons charged in being fully acquitted. The benefit to the state is ultimately linked to the perceptions of legitimacy that may follow from the services
provided by defense counsel. Our analysis here seeks to chart what the impact of
lawyers’ presence will have on the substance and outcomes of interrogations.
The data’s most surprising finding is that, in terms of confessions, it did not
seem to make that much difference whether lawyers were present or not. This
finding is counter-intuitive to much of the advocacy that has pervaded public and
legal debates concerning access of terrorist detainees to legal counsel.146 In our
Northern Ireland dataset, confessions were more likely in situations covered by
the regular criminal law (PACE (NI) cases) where defense counsel was present
(29 percent) than in PTA cases (22 percent) where none was present (Table 6).
In many of the heated debates concerning detention of persons suspected of
terrorist crimes, states continue to press for extended detention of suspects—and
usually meet significant resistance from civil libertarians and others concerned
with the effect on due process rights and the rule of law.147 The latter’s concerns
are usually based on the dangers of abrogating basic common law and statutory
principles concerned with regulating the time between detention and charging
persons detained with an offense. There is also concern about the propensity
for torture or ill-treatment in custody based on lack of access to a lawyer.
Based on the data above, some the debate seems misplaced, at least as far as
confessions are concerned. In this study, it seems clear that if a confession is
going to be made by a terrorist suspect, it is likely to be made in the first 48
hours of detention—75 percent for oral confessions (Table 7). This suggests
145. Nı́ Aoláin, Lawyers, Military Commissions and the Rule of Law in Democratic States supra note
106.
146. See Charles Donahue, Jr., An Historical Argument for Right to Counsel During Police
Interrogation, 73 YALE L.J. 1000, 1034–45 (1964) (summarizing the history of the right to counsel
during the investigative process).
147. See, e.g., HOUSE OF LORDS AND HOUSE OF COMMONS JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS,
COUNTER-TERRORISM POLICY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: 28 DAYS, INTERCEPT AND POST-CHARGE
QUESTIONING, 2006-07, HL 157, HC 394 (UK), https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt200607/jtselect/
jtrights/157/157.pdf; CLAIRE FEIKERT, LAW LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, UNITED KINGDOM: PRE-CHARGE
DETENTION FOR TERRORIST SUSPECTS (2008), https://www.loc.gov/law/help/uk-pre-charge-detention/
uk-pre-charge-detention.pdf.
In France, following the July 2016 Nice attack, authorities extended a state of emergency that had
been invoked following previous attacks in 2015 pursuant to France’s 1955 governing states of
emergency. See Loi 2016-1767 du 19 décembre 2016 prorogeant l’application de la loi n˚ 55-385 du 3
avril 1955 relative a` l’état d’urgence [Law No. 2016-1767 of 19 December 2016 Extending the
Application of Law No. 55-385 of 3 April 1955 Regarding the State of Emergency], Journal Officiel de
la Re´publique Française [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], Dec. 20, 2016. For a criticism of the
expansion of police power in France, see Elias Groll, Hollande’s Post-Paris Power Grab, FOREIGN
POLICY (Nov. 20, 2015), http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/11/20/hollandes-post-paris-power-grab/.
For a discussion of this issue in Germany, see Christopher Michaelson, From Strasbourg with Love:
Preventive Detention before the German Federal Constitutional Court and the European Court of
Human Rights, 12 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 148 (2012).
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Table 6. Presence of Lawyers and Confessions
Confession
Oral
L. Presence &
Interrogation
L. Present All Interrogations
L. Present Some
Interrogations
L. Not Present
Not known
Total

Written & Oral

Row
%

Count

Row
%

12

29%

1

2%

0

0%

0

17

22%

0
29

None

Total

Row
%

Count

Col
%

29

69%

42

33%

0%

4

100%

4

3%

1

1%

58

76%

76

60%

0%

0

0%

5

100%

5

4%

23%

2

2%

96

76%

127

100%

that efforts to protect the due process rights and to protect access to legal counsel rights for individuals should be concentrated on this first critical period. It
indicates that state efforts to keep detainees for longer periods on the basis that
more time produces more confessions has little empirical basis. There may, of
course, be other rationale for longer detention from the state’s perspective—
including other forms of evidence gathering and case preparation—but efficacy
of producing confessions is not one of them.
In the period mapped here we identify a discrete group—9 percent—who
appear to be subject to more extensive interrogation (Table 7). This group is particularly significant in terms of international legal regulation, since significantly
extended detention of these individuals would likely be dependent on derogation
by the United Kingdom from its international obligations under the International

13

23

Total

0

Written & oral

None

1

Oral

Confessions

18%

14%

0%

34%

Row %

0-12

30

25

0

5

24%

26%

0%

17%

Row %

12-24

22

19

0

3

17%

20%

0%

10%

Row %

24-36

25

20

1

4

20%

21%

50%

14%

Row %

36-48

3

1

0

2

2%

1%

0%

7%

Row %

48-60

Time in Police Custody

3

3

0

0

2%

3%

0%

0%

Row %

72 - 96

Table 7. Time in Custody and Confessions

12

10

0

2

9%

10%

0%

7%

Row %

961

9

5

1

3

Not

7%

5%

50%

10%

Row %

Known

127

96

2

29

Total

100%

100%

100%

100%

Row %
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Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the European Convention on Human
Rights.148 In most cases however, detaining the person for an extended period did
not secure a confession. This data shows only two confessions based upon the derogation, questioning the need for it, if the stated premise is securing confessional
evidence. This finding (if replicable in other states derogating their obligations to
enable extended detention) confirms that specialist review bodies such as regional
human rights courts or U.N. bodies, should pay particularly close attention to the
practices of states in the context of extended detention. Robust skepticism as to the
necessity of detention to enable confessions would seem to be in order.
In multiple jurisdictions dealing with terrorist crime and threats, an important
normative discussion arises concerning the number of interrogation sessions
which may be necessary in order to secure confessional evidence to aid conviction of a detainee. In this analysis, we particularly focus on the discrete group of
detainees who are not only being held for extended periods of detention but are
also being subject to multiple interrogation sessions. A counter-intuitive pattern
emerges: a discrete subset of 9 percent of detainees are being subjected to 17 plus
interrogation sessions (Table 8). Walsh’s earlier study found only 2 percent subjected to 16 plus interrogation sessions in what many might describe as the most
evident military phase of the conflict and where the civilian deaths and casualties
were higher statistically.149 One explanation here, noting the later stage of conflict
and greater international attention on the state’s actions, is that interrogators
attempted extensive interrogation in order to achieve results that previously may
have been achieved by intensive, and potentially abusive, interrogation.150
These results indicate some traction to the theory of institutional imprinting,
and its specific play in the interrogation context. It is notable that there was
only one confession in an instance where there were 17 plus interrogation sessions. This outcome questions the effectiveness of the powers granted, and the

148. Following the September 11 terrorist attacks in the United States, and believing that certain
foreign nationals present in the U.K. were providing support for Islamist terrorist operations, the United
Kingdom issued an Article 15 (Derogation in Times of Emergency) notice of derogation from its Article
5 § 1 (Right to Liberty and Security) obligations. For an in-depth discussion of the legality of this
derogation, see A. and Others v. The United Kingdom, 2009-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 137; Marko Milanovic,
European Court Decides A and Others v. United Kingdom, EJIL: TALK! (Feb. 19, 2009), http://www.
ejiltalk.org/european-court-decides-a-and-others-v-united-kingdom/. While derogation is, we argue, at
issue in the extended detention scenario, we note that a significant legal issue in this context is the point
of judicial oversight.
149. WALSH, supra note 20, at 65; On patterns of death during the conflict see DAVID MCKITTRICK
ET AL, LOST LIVES: THE STORIES OF THE MEN, WOMEN AND CHILDREN WHO DIED AS A RESULT OF THE
NORTHERN IRELAND TROUBLES (2001).
150. On abusive interrogation practices in the jurisdiction, see Report of the Commission of Inquiry
into Police Interrogation Procedures in Northern Ireland, 1979, Cmnd. 9497 (UK) [hereinafter The
Bennett Report]. On international attention to the state’s human rights obligations in the context of
fighting terrorism, see, e.g., COUNCIL OF EUROPE, DIRECTORATE GENERAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS,
GUIDELINES ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM (December 2002), https://polis.
osce.org/node/4956.
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Table 8. No. of Interrogation Sessions and Confessions
Number of Interrogation Sessions
1–3
Confession
(s)
Oral

4–9

Row
%

10–16

Row
%

171

Row
%

Total

Row
%

Count

Col
%

15

52%

9

31%

4

14%

1

3%

29

23%

0

0%

1

50%

1

50%

0

0%

2

2%

None

36

38%

41

43%

8

8%

11

11%

96

76%

Total

51

40%

51

40%

13

10%

12

9%

127

100%

Written &
Oral

legitimacy of their operation on the terms sought by the Executive Branch.151
CONCLUSION
Our exploration of the trajectory between norm and exception challenges
scholarly and policy claims of a one way and highly static relationship between
these phenomena in situations of crisis, particularly those occasioned by terrorism. Our data and analysis demonstrates that there is far more inter-activity
between exceptional and ordinary law concerning arrest, detention and trial in
democracies managing terrorist challenges than has generally been observed to
151. This also from an international human rights law perspective opens up significant questions on
the necessity for the derogation from treaty obligations. On derogation in emergency, see Fionnuala Nı´
Aoláin & Oren Gross, From Discretion to Scrutiny: Revisiting the Application of the Margin of
Appreciation Doctrine in the Context of Article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights, 23
HUM. RTS. Q. 625 (2001).
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date. This is particularly true of a long-term, low-intensity conflict/high-intensity
emergency when interrogation, arrest and trial become an integral part of dealing
with terrorism. What we observe is a process of osmosis between the exception
and the norm. This results in a “norm” that partly mirrors the legal contours of the
exception. In short, over time ordinary law and practice absorbs and is modified
by the reality that an exceptional legal system is operating by its side to manage
terrorism. As this article demonstrates, in long-term conflicts or processes of
managing terrorism the exception is hybridized to create new norms that embody
both the exception and the ordinary law. This article charts that ebb and flow
between the normal legal system and the exceptional legal system through processes of arrest, detention, interrogation and criminal trial. We show that exceptionality is accommodated but most importantly that exceptionality and normal
legal process are not in a linear relationship. The relationships between legal
norm and exception in the long-term management of terrorism are neither simple
nor easily categorized.
By and large the following conclusions can be drawn. First, the move to exceptional (often ill-considered) legal process which generally emerges in the initial
phase of a democratic state’s responses to terrorism is invariably modified. The
modification results from the trend toward juridification in democratic societies.
Democracies have a variable tolerance for outright extra-legality, and courts in
particular feel the pull of legitimacy and rights-bearing claims which results over
time to greater legal normality. Second, that tug to the juridic is not linear and can
result in the extra-ordinary contaminating the ordinary legal system. This process
of osmosis from the exceptional to the norm can have long-term effects on the integrity of the legal system, whereby norms created to regulate terrorism are
absorbed into the regular criminal law in insidious ways. Third, the shape and
scope of the regular legal process, institutional identity and security sector behavior is shaped and influenced by their long-term interaction with the exceptional
legal process. Most notably in the United Kingdom this is evidenced by the
Terrorism Act of 2000 (not examined in this study) which absorbed decades of
exceptional anti-terrorism legislation and now has been woven into the fabric of
everyday law in the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland.152
The longitudinal analysis of the dataset referenced in this study (circa 400
cases in tranches from 1988 to 2001), notably points to an increasing juridification of the exception over time, suggesting that the law has a centripetal effect
and supporting what David Dyzenhaus has referred to as a “compulsion to legality.”153 That compulsion is not merely an abstract phenomenon but, as we reflect
here, has practical and significant effects on practices in the custodial settings
which operate as one of the effective front lines on terrorism. In a state with an
152. See Christian A. Honeywood, Britain’s Approach to Balancing Counter-Terrorism Laws with
Human Rights, 9 J. STRATEGIC SEC. 28, 41–43 (2016) (noting the evolution of the British approach to
litigation involving terrorism claims).
153. David Dyzenhaus, The Compulsion of Legality, in EMERGENCIES AND THE LIMITS OF LEGALITY
33, 34 (Victor V. Ramraj ed., 2008).
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ideological commitment to the rule of law, we claim that a strategy of illegality in
the field of counter-insurgency is unlikely to be viable in the middle to long term.
If the long-term U.S. experience with Military Commissions culminating in
their post-9/11 incarnations is compared to the United Kingdom’s experience of
counter-insurgency tribunals culminating in the Diplock courts, one conclusion
might be that they show similarities in trajectories of progressive juridification.
Another might be that Diplock Courts are further along the curve, leading one to
implicitly question the viability of the military commissions option in the long
term.154 At the very least our data point to the trajectories that follow in democratic states when long-term use is made of the criminal justice system to manage
terrorism.
Managing terrorism is an enormous contemporary challenge. We observe that
little sustained empirical knowledge has infused much of the contemporary legal
and political debates concerning terrorism measures in the United Kingdom, the
United States and beyond. Contemporary assertions about how to manage terrorism abound with untested assertions, and with little more than conjecture on what
“works,” or what the long-term effects of terrorism legislation might be on the
rule of law. Our study, while focused on a particular period in a particular jurisdiction, seeks to pry open some of that untested territory in order to demonstrate
long-term consequences and effects of counter-terrorism practice and thus challenge some sacred cows of counter-terrorism orthodoxy. Much more of this kind
of long-term empirical work in the courts and in detention settings is needed to
pin down the efficacy, value, and costs of substantially modifying the legal system over time to process violent political actors. Ultimately, the positive rule of
law trajectories demonstrated in this study give us hope, not least because the pull
to juridification remains strong, no matter the length or substance of challenge to
the state. In a final salvo, it is worth noting that the conflict and terrorism challenges in Northern Ireland were not ultimately managed to a solution by the
courts, nor by military action, but rather by addressing the conditions conducive
to terrorism and concluding a complex and contested peace agreement among
protagonists. This may be the obvious and definitive lesson about managing terrorism successfully.

154. The juncture between the war on terror and criminalization/normalization was played out again
to some extent between 2001–05, resulting again in a decision in favor of the latter as the only effective
stance in the age of long-term ‘neighbour terrorism.’ See A v. Secretary of State for the Home
Department [2004] UKHL 56 (appeal taken from Eng.); Clive Walker, ‘Know Thine Enemy as Thyself’:
Discerning Friend from Foe under Anti-Terrorism Laws, 32 MELB. U. L. REV. 275 (2008).
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APPENDIX: METHODOLOGY
The data set out in the tables are drawn from a survey of 127 cases which comprise all those tried in the Northern Ireland Diplock courts in 2000 and in 2001.
After that period, Diplock trials tapered off significantly. The trial of one individual is referred to as a ‘case’; several such cases could be tried on one indictment,
and in each case the defendant typically faced a number of charges. The same
approach was taken with the 272 cases from 1988–89. The sample periods,
January to March 1989 and January to March 1990, were chosen because they
came before and after the coming into force of the Criminal Evidence (NI) Order
1988, which severely abrogated the right to silence in Northern Ireland (approximately equivalent to Miranda rights in the United States), and thus might provide
some data on the operation in practice of the Order. For the sake of clarity, the
1988–89 data are not included in this paper’s tables, although the text includes salient results from analysis of these data.
For each case, a data sheet listing such variables as time of arrest, place of
arrest and other relevant criteria was completed by referring to the ‘Crown Book’
and the court files. The authors were given access to these files and had ethical
and security clearance to undertake the research. Being common law-based,
Diplock court procedure is roughly similar to that employed in U.S. criminal
courts. The Crown book records such details as the name of the defendant, the
charges, the plea, the trial judge and the outcome. The court files consist largely
of a statement of the evidence against the accused. From the police evidence, it
was generally possible to build up a picture of the arrest procedure and of the
interrogation process (or at least the police versions of them). In some cases, evidence could be assessed through an examination of forensic reports. This information was then coded (using a detailed code sheet) and cross-tabulations
generated using SPSS.
Much of the data consisted of hard factual material (such as details of charges),
the collection of which was unproblematic. There were however two elements
that involved a degree of subjective judgment. The first entailed an assessment of
the strength of the evidence, other than confession evidence, against the accused.
This was particularly important in measuring the degree of dependence of the
Diplock system on confessions. Following Walsh’s Diplock court study (1983),
the rule of thumb we adopted was that strong circumstantial, identification, or forensic evidence was taken to amount to substantial evidence, while other material
was considered insubstantial.
The second area in which a degree of subjective judgment was involved
came in assessing the status of the defendant (‘paramilitary/terrorist-type,’
non-paramilitary/criminal, security forces). Examination of the 1988–89 court
files, particularly of the police evidence, soon revealed that a significant number of those being tried were facing charges that seemed to have nothing to do
with political violence. A typical example might be two defendants who apparently decided to rob a chip shop with an imitation firearm after a Friday
night’s drinking binge.
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This state of affairs came about largely because of the mandatory way in which
offenses were channeled to the Diplock courts at that time (this was later
changed). In some cases, the question of status was easy to decide, in others less
so. Again, following Walsh (1983), the test used was that:
[I]f the offence was carried out ostensibly for the furtherance of a paramilitary
objective, for sectarian purposes or by members of the security forces in allegedly countering terrorism then it was classified as political or terrorist. Such
offences would cover ones of shooting members of the security forces or robbing banks to boost the financial resources of a paramilitary organization. Also
included, however, are rioting and hijacking which in many cases could be
interpreted more as mere hooliganism than as being politically motivated.
Sectarian attacks and offences committed by the security forces while on
active duty, such as grievous bodily harm inflicted in the interrogation room
are also included because they are so closely related to the current violence to
justify their being treated in this way. If the offence was carried out by the individual ostensibly for his own personal gain or gratification then it was classified as ordinary criminal. . . . It should be noted here that the mere fact of
membership of, or association with a paramilitary group would not, in itself,
be decisive in this classification.155

Where there was some doubt about the matter, this survey tended to err on the
side of caution by viewing the suspect as paramilitary unless the evidence clearly
suggested otherwise.

155. WALSH, supra note 20, at 16-17.
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